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Abstract  
 
Rapid environmental change, ranging from the collapse of fisheries to the rise of 
sea levels, poses significant challenges for the governance of marine resources. In Pacific 
Island Countries and Territories (PICTs), these changes result in the loss of marine 
resources, threatening both the biodiversity of coastal ecosystems and the communities 
that rely on them. Existing top-down, centralized forms of environmental governance 
lack the flexibility needed to address these issues especially at local scales, while bottom-
up approaches often lack the coordination and authority needed to respond quickly to 
change. More adaptive forms of marine governance are needed to ensure that PICTs are 
able to respond effectively to these environmental changes. Researchers in environmental 
governance have proposed “adaptive governance” (AG) as an alternative mode of 
governing resources that balances the benefits of top-down and bottom-up approaches. 
Past research has led to proposals for specific characteristics of such a system, including 
calls for enabling adaptive management, for inclusive participation of stakeholders, and 
for incorporating multiple types of knowledge into decision making. However, further 
empirical evidence is necessary to develop these characteristics and to identify the 
barriers to their emergence, especially in non-Western contexts. The thesis research 
described here contributes to filling this gap through a case study analysis of the Solomon 
Islands Fishery Management Act (FMA) of 2015 as a potential example of emerging 
adaptive governance. Specific focus is given to a provision within the FMA (2015) that 
will enable communities to use government police and court systems to enforce their 
local fishing rules, if they successfully submit a marine management plan to the 
government. This study location provides a unique opportunity to pay specific attention 
to the AG suggestion for the inclusion of different types of knowledge, as both science 
and local ecological knowledge are used by governance actors in the Solomon Islands. 
Data collection methods include a deductive policy analysis, participant observation, and 
semi-structured interviews with Pacific fisheries policy experts as well as fisheries 
managers, conservation practitioners, and fishers in the Solomon Islands. The results of 
this analysis indicate that several characteristics of AG may be emerging in the Solomon 
Islands with the introduction of the FMA (2015), including openness to the incorporation 
of multiple types of knowledge. However, a more in depth analysis of knowledge 
processes reveal some potential barriers to the emergence of this characteristic, and of 
AG more broadly; for instance, the strict requirements of the FMA (2015) may restrict 
the ability of communities to successfully submit plans and therefore benefit from this 
provision. This research builds a deeper understanding of knowledge-related barriers to 
the emergence of AG and introduces an approach to detect these barriers during an AG 
analysis that can be further developed in the future.    
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Rapid environmental change, ranging from the collapse of fisheries, to ocean 
acidification, to the rise of sea levels, poses significant challenges for the effective management 
of marine resources (Mullon et al. 2005, Folke 2007, Rockstrom et al. 2009, Osterblom and 
Folke 2013, IPCC 2014). In Pacific Islands Countries and Territories (PICTs), these threats are 
compounded by rapid social changes brought about by processes of globalization and the growth 
of a market-based economy. These shifts can lead to the unsustainable extraction of resources 
through activities like logging and offshore fishing (Albert et al. 2014, Jupiter et al. 2014). 
Addressing these threats is critical for mitigating potentially severe local impacts on the 
biodiversity of island ecosystems, and on the livelihoods of highly resource-dependent Pacific 
communities (Osterblom and Folke 2013).  
Past approaches to resource management have incorrectly assumed that change only 
happens gradually, that it is enough to focus on just one issue or resource at a time, and that 
ecosystems will naturally return to a specific, balanced state (Lemos and Agrawal 2006, Folke et 
al. 2005). These perceptions have inspired centralized systems of decision making based on 
strong state control and scientific expertise (Folke et al. 2005). However, this frequently fails to 
adequately address environmental problems for several reasons: this approach does not respond 
effectively to rapid, severe changes, neglects to address issues at ecologically relevant scales, 
lacks the capacity to coordinate across scales and sectors, and does not effectively tailor efforts 
to specific contexts within state jurisdiction (Lemos and Agrawal 2006, Folke et al. 2005, 
Huitema et al. 2009). Recent research has suggested alternative, more adaptive systems for 
making decisions about natural resources that may possess the flexibility needed to overcome 
these challenges (Folke et al. 2005, Huitema et al. 2009). The potential for the use of different 
types of knowledge in decision making to improve adaptability is an emerging theme within this 
line of research. This thesis seeks to add to this conversation by exploring possible barriers to the 
emergence of more adaptive systems for governing resources, with specific attention given to 
barriers related to the use of different types of knowledge in decision making.  
In this thesis, I investigate a case study of inshore fisheries in the Solomon Islands, where 
a recently passed national fisheries act provides a potential example of a policy improving the 
adaptiveness of a natural resource management system. A mix of customary marine resource 
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tenure systems and western approaches to resource management in this context facilitates the 
focus of this study on the incorporation of different types of knowledge into decision-making 
processes. This investigation of fisheries governance in a PICT where the impacts from rapid 
population growth, extractive industries (e.g. logging, offshore fishing), and climate change are 
imminent. The results of this research may contribute to the country’s effort to address these 
issues, while also offering insights relevant to other PICTs and potentially to developing 
countries facing similar changes in other regions (Green et al. 2006, Macintyre and Foale 2004, 
Albert et al. 2014, Jupiter et al. 2014). I engage in this endeavor on the following premises: first, 
that the decision-making processes examined within governance research are intimately tangled 
up with concerns around what and whose knowledge is used in decisions, and, second, that 
because of the link between knowledge and power, a governance analysis that does not pay close 
attention to these concerns would not only be incomplete, but might also produce results that 
lack the contextual awareness required when working in post-colonial contexts. Here I offer a 
starting point for developing this awareness of knowledge-related concerns within an adaptive 
governance analysis.   
 
1.1 Introducing Adaptive Governance 
This study approaches marine management issues from the perspective of environmental 
governance. Governance is defined as the “structures and processes by which people in society 
make decisions and share power” (Folke et al. 2005). This includes the “system of institutions 
(including rules, laws, regulations, policies, and social norms) and organizations involved in 
governing environmental resource use and/or protection” (Chaffin et al. 2014). This perspective 
allows for a holistic examination of the formal and informal actors and institutions that influence 
the relationship between society and marine resources, bringing to the fore the role of institutions 
beyond government, such as NGOs and community-based groups (Lemos and Agrawal 2006, 
Folke et al. 2007, Osterblom and Folke 2013, Chaffin et al. 2014). This perspective informs 
proposals for alternatives to the centralized, technocratic systems that so often fail to address 
environmental issues (Folke et al. 2007). 
The failure of centralized systems initially led to a number of bottom-up approaches to 
natural resource management, including collaborative conservation and community-based 
resource management (CBRM). Although these alternative approaches can produce more 
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context-appropriate strategies, they can suffer from coordination problems and an inability to 
react quickly to system-scale disruptions (Lemos and Agrawal 2006, Chaffin et al. 2014). In 
response, the idea of “adaptive governance,” also called “adaptive co-management” (Huitema et 
al. 2009) or “network governance” (Scarlett and McKinney 2016), has emerged as a blended 
governance arrangement able to allow flexibility for coping with rapid socioecological change 
and uncertainty (Folke et al. 2005, Olsson et al. 2006, Chaffin et al. 2014, De Caro et al. 2017). 
Adaptive governance (AG) scholarship builds on research in CBRM and socio-ecological 
resilience (SES). Resilience research re-conceptualizes environmental problems by: 1) explicitly 
recognizing the link between environmental and social systems through a SES approach, 2) 
acknowledging the possibility of multiple states for an SES rather than assuming an SES has 
only one state to which it will always return after disturbance, and 3) focusing on the resilience 
of the SES. Resilience is defined by Folke et al. 2005 as the “extent to which a system can 
absorb recurrent natural and human perturbations and continue to regenerate without slowly 
degrading or even unexpectedly flipping into less desirable states” (Gunderson 2000, Gunderson 
and Holling 2002, Folke et al. 2005). From this perspective, AG is seen as the governance 
arrangement necessary for facilitating the ability of an SES to a) be resilient, meaning able to 
reorganize after a disturbance in order to remain in a desired state, or b) transform from an 
undesirable state towards a desirable state identified by actors within a governance system 
(Walker et al. 2004, Folke et al. 2005).  
Literature on adaptive governance to date has focused on identifying key components of 
adaptive governance by investigating a limited number of empirical examples (Chaffin et al. 
2014). The characteristics of adaptive governance vary across locations but typically include the 
following traits: nested, polycentric centers of decision making authority fit to a biogeographic 
scale appropriate for the environmental challenge being addressed, along with processes that 
allow for broad participation, enables leadership, social learning, experimental approaches to 
management and policy, and the inclusion of multiple types of knowledge in decisions (Folke et 
al. 2005, Olsson et al. 2006, Armitage et al. 2009, Huitema et al. 2009, Chaffin et al. 2014). Each 
of these characteristics is defined in the Frameworks for Analysis section. Examples of places 
where these characteristics of adaptive governance are emerging are starting to be recorded (e.g. 
Schultz et al. 2015, Chaffin et al. 2016), and design principles that may enable adaptive 
governance have been outlined (e.g. De Caro et al. 2017). However, more empirical evidence is 
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needed to understand what these characteristics look like in practice, and what barriers exist to 
the emergence of AG overall (Chaffin et al. 2014, Wyborn et al. 2016). It is especially necessary 
to explore AG in PICTS, where vulnerability to rapid environmental change and high-resource 
dependency make understanding and developing adaptive modes of governance especially 
important (Osterblom and Folke 2013, Jupiter et al. 2014). In this study, I gather empirical 
evidence through a case study of inshore fisheries1 governance in the Solomon Island, with a 
specific focus on a new Solomon Islands National Fisheries Management Act (FMA) (2015). I 
assess the degree to which governance arrangements in this case study reflect the characteristics 
of adaptive governance proposed in the literature, with particular attention to the suggestion for 
the inclusion of multiple types of knowledge.  
The suggestion for the inclusion of multiple types of knowledge provides an alternative 
to the approach of centralized, technocratic systems, which rely primarily on scientific expertise 
(Folke et al. 2005, Armitage et al. 2009, Wyborn et al. 2016). Van Kerkhoff and Lebel (2006) 
define knowledge as “justifiable belief,” and recognize that different forms of knowledge use 
different criteria for what counts as justification (e.g., peer review is an important part of 
justifying scientific knowledge). The need to explicitly consider the relationship between 
knowledge and decision making in an adaptive governance analysis has been identified in the 
literature, but has not been fully explored (Armitage et al. 2009, Wyborn et al. 2016). Attention 
to this AG suggestion not only contributes to the overall need for empirical evidence to better 
understand what AG characteristics look like in practice, but also addresses a need to place more 
attention on understanding the power dynamics within adaptive governance arrangements 
(Chaffin et al. 2014, Wyborn et al. 2016, De Caro et al. 2017). This originates in discussions of 
good governance and the normative elements of adaptive governance, such as ‘who’ decides the 
desired state of an SES, which in turn raises questions about whose knowledge is drawn on and 
privileged in decision making (van Kerkhoff and Lebel 2006, Chaffin et al. 2014, Wyborn et al. 
2016). The need to consider the power dynamics involved with the use of different types of 
knowledge in decision making is especially pressing in the post-colonial context of the Pacific, 
and is complicated by the presence of both customary and western systems of law that have 
become hybridized (Pulea 1993, Aswani et al. 2007). Here I add an additional lens to my 
                                               
1 “Inshore” fisheries here refers to the reef and shallow areas immediately adjacent to the shore, with the 
nearshore zone being further out. 
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analysis of AG characteristics in the Solomon Island by investigating the incorporation of 
different knowledge types into decision making, and identifying knowledge-related barriers to 
the emergence of adaptive governance. Within this I initiate a reflexive conversation around the 
methodology used to conduct governance analyses in the context of the Pacific, and the Global 
South more broadly.  
 
1.2 Research Questions and Objectives 
Questions:  
1. How are different types of knowledge incorporated (or not) into decision making around 
inshore fisheries in the Solomon Islands? 
2. What is the relationship between the use of different types of knowledge in inshore fisheries 
governance, and the emergence of adaptive governance in the Solomon Islands?  
3. What, if anything, does a focus on knowledge add to an analysis of adaptive governance? 
Objectives:  
1. Assess inshore fisheries governance in the Solomon Islands, with a focus on the Fisheries 
Management Act (FMA) of 2015, to determine the degree to which current arrangements 
reflect institutional prescriptions for adaptive governance.    
2. Apply the knowledge governance analysis framework created by van Kerkhoff and 
Pilbeam (2017) to better understand the role of knowledge governance in the governance 
of inshore small-scale fisheries at the national and local level, and how this is adhered to 
or not within the FMA (2015). 
a. Apply the framework to national level community-based fisheries management 
efforts and policy-making (generally centered on actors and decisions in the 
capital city of Honiara, Solomon Islands). 
b. Apply the framework to local level decision making in Mbili Village, Solomon 
Islands around small-scale fisheries within their customary boundaries. 
3. Suggest theoretical refinements in the relationship between knowledge governance and 
adaptive governance with evidence from this empirical investigation. Specifically, 
provide insight into the utility of the knowledge governance framework when conducting 
an analysis of environmental governance contexts.  
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4. Propose modifications to van Kerkhoff and Pilbeam’s (2017) knowledge governance 
framework based on my experience and evidence collected from the Solomon Islands 
case.  
 
1.3 Organization of the Thesis 
This thesis is organized into four major sections. The next section provides an in-depth 
discussion of my theoretical framework, which integrates literature on adaptive governance with 
research on the value of utilizing multiple types of knowledge. The methodology section 
introduces the detailed context of the study site and the methods used within this case study 
approach. Section three includes the results and discussion of the governance analysis. This is 
followed by a final concluding section summarizing key points, limitations, and future directions 
for research. 
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2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
This section provides the theoretical framework for exploring the use of different types of 
knowledge within the analysis of a case study of adaptive governance. I elaborate on the 
development of this characteristic of adaptive governance, and introduce a theoretical lens used 
to guide this layer of the analysis. I explore the potential of this theoretical lens to expose 
knowledge processes that influence (support, undermine) the emergence of adaptive governance.  
 
2.1 Adaptive Governance & the Recommendation to Include Multiple Types of 
Knowledge  
The recommendation to include multiple types of knowledge in decision making relates 
closely to the academic discourse on the utility of “traditional” or “local” ecological knowledge 
(TEK or LEK; LEK used herein) for conservation and resource management. Here I will employ 
Berkes et al.’s (2000) definition of LEK: “a cumulative body of knowledge, practice, and belief, 
evolving by adaptive processes and handed down through generations by cultural transmission, 
and about the relationship of living beings (including humans) with one another and with their 
environment.” The term “LEK” will be used here to focus on the idea that this knowledge is held 
by long-term local residents of a place, and to avoid the pitfalls of the term “traditional” as 
seeming to limit local peoples’ knowledge to a certain time period (Berkes et al. 2000, Ellen and 
Harris 2000). Research on LEK is inherently interdisciplinary (Ruddle and Davis 2013), existing 
at the intersection between research on CBRM (e.g. Govan 2009, Lauer 2017), sustainability 
science (e.g. Cash et al. 2003), indigenous research (e.g. Simpson 2004), conservation biology 
(e,g. Gadgil et al. 1993), and SES resilience (e.g. Bohensky and Maru 2011); prominent 
researchers on the subject have authored papers in more than one of these fields, and have also 
authored papers in the field of environmental governance (e.g. Agrawal, Berkes, Folke, Ruddle).  
Research on LEK originally emerged as a rebuttal to initial assumptions that LEK is 
inferior to science, which came out of a technocratic, colonial perspective that is severely 
critiqued by LEK scholars (Agrawal 1995, Tuhiwai Smith 2012). To briefly summarize 
conclusions from this work, the value of including LEK within decision making is generally 
motivated by an interest in (1) improving the knowledge base for conservation biology or natural 
resource management, or (2) indigenous empowerment (Gadgil et al. 1993, Bohensky and Maru 
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2011). The experiential knowledge of practitioners and indigenous peoples is valued because it 
can provide highly contextualized information gathered over long periods of time, which can fill 
gaps in scientific information (Gadgil et al. 1993, Bohensky and Maru 2011). Those interested in 
empowering indigenous peoples emphasize that in addition to providing useful information, the 
inclusion of LEK in decision making can provide a means of empowering indigenous peoples 
(Agrawal 1995, Bohensky and Maru 2011). The importance of incorporating LEK into 
management decisions is now widely recognized in research on community-based resource 
management (CBRM) and this has subsequently been infused into recommendations for adaptive 
governance (Gadgil et al. 1993, Agrawal 1995, Folke et al. 2005, Armitage et al. 2009, Bohensky 
and Maru 2011, Chaffin et al. 2014). This recommendation comes in alongside the suggestion 
that science should play an important role in decision making within adaptive governance 
regimes (Dietz et al. 2003, Folke et al. 2005).  
The field of sustainability science promotes the incorporation of science and technology 
into decision making as a key strategy for achieving sustainable development, and explores the 
means to achieve this (Cash et al. 2003). Cash et al. (2006) bring this recommendation directly 
into adaptive governance scholarship, where it fits naturally with the recommendation that 
experimentation and adaptive management be enabled within governance regimes (Huitema et 
al. 2009, Chaffin et al. 2014). Recognition of the importance of both science and LEK in 
adaptive governance is summarized by Armitage et al. (2009, p.101): 
Both expert and non-expert knowledge can play productive and essential roles in 
problem identification, framing, and analysis. The tendency in most resource 
management contexts is to emphasize differences in knowledge systems. 
However, there are substantial contributions to social-ecological understanding, 
trust-building, and learning. 
The inclusion of multiple types of knowledge is clearly indicated as important for the emergence 
of adaptive governance. A critical examination of this recommendation is therefore necessary on 
two fronts reminiscent of the conversation within LEK literature. First, because governance 
research recognizes that the benefits of incorporating multiple types of knowledge may facilitate 
a transition to adaptive governance, a method of assessing the extent to which this is being 
achieved is needed. Second, concerns regarding the power dynamics at play when bringing LEK 
and science together in decisions are closely related to other aspects of adaptive governance, 
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such as the prescription for inclusive participation, and the broader assumption that “good 
governance” is an essential aspect of adaptive governance regimes. “Good governance” is 
concerned with the normative aspects of how governance should be conducted and focuses on 
issues of social justice (Lockwood 2010). Although the concept arises from governance 
scholarship beyond environmental concerns (e.g., Weiss 2000), it’s relevance to adaptive 
governance is starting to be debated in environmental governance literature (e.g., Lebel et al. 
2006, Lockwood 2010, Chaffin et al. 2014). Lockwood (2010) articulates that governance is 
“good” when it is legitimate, transparent, accountable, inclusive, fair, connected, and resilient. If 
“good governance” is indeed important for the emergence and longevity of adaptive governance, 
the almost inherent link between knowledge and power demands that governance analyses give 
attention to power dynamics between knowledge holders (e.g. researchers, indigenous peoples).  
There has been little previous work to develop a method for giving attention to either of 
these two concerns within empirical assessments of the emergence of adaptive governance. The 
concept of knowledge governance, described below, provides a critical lens for analysis that may 
begin to address each of these concerns by uncovering knowledge processes within a governance 
regime that present barriers to or catalysts for the incorporation of multiple types of knowledge, 
and by drawing attention to the norms and social rules within a regime that influence whose 
knowledge is valued in decision making. 
 
2.2 Knowledge Governance 
 The few efforts that have been made to bring a more explicit consideration of knowledge 
processes into adaptive governance research have done so by utilizing research on knowledge 
co-production (e.g., Wyborn 2015). Research on knowledge co-production has been used to 
build an analytical framework for examining the use of science in decision making, referred to as 
“knowledge governance” (van Kerkhoff 2013). Knowledge governance refers to “the formal and 
informal rules and conventions that shape the ways we conduct or engage in knowledge 
processes” (van Kerkhoff & Pilbeam 2017). Such processes include knowledge creation, sharing, 
protection, access, and application (van Kerkhoff & Pilbeam 2017). This creates a shift from 
viewing knowledge as an input, to knowledge as the subject of governance, giving it the 
potential to reveal a different dimension of barriers and catalysts to AG emergence than explored 
in previous studies. Research in knowledge governance operates on the assumption that the rules 
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that govern these processes shape decisions and action, and that these rules can be manipulated 
towards defined goals (van Kerkhoff 2013). Knowledge governance and adaptive governance 
share an interest in the role of collaborative knowledge construction for addressing complex 
problems, and for reflexivity and learning in the face of the uncertainty (van Kerkhoff 2013).  
 Research on the governance of knowledge began with an interest in the challenges of 
connecting science with environmental decision making (Gerritsen, Stuiver, & Termeer 2013, 
van Kerkhoff & Pilbeam 2017). The concept of knowledge governance has its roots in two 
separate but related fields, which it intends to bridge: sustainability science, and science and 
technology studies (STS) (van Kerkhoff & Pilbeam 2017). Sustainability science comes from the 
normative perspective that science should have a “stronger voice” in decision making and has 
sought to understand science-society relationships with this goal in mind (van Kerkhoff & 
Pilbeam 2017). The problem of how to connect scientific knowledge with action is front and 
center in this field, which explicitly recognizes that using science to spread awareness of an issue 
is not enough—it must lead to action, but accomplishing this is difficult (van Kerkhoff & Lebel 
2006). Cash et al (2003) contributed substantially to this field by suggesting that the extent to 
which science is accepted by the public is dependent on the extent to which it is perceived as 
credible, legitimate, and salient. This study and others in this field criticize the linear view of 
knowledge as something produced by researchers and subsequently brought to action by 
practitioners, on the grounds that it neglects to notice barriers between knowledge systems that 
prevent such a simple transfer (Cash et al. 2003, van Kerkhoff & Lebel 2006). Instead, they 
recommend that researchers engage as active participants in social change and suggest strategies 
like coproduction—joint knowledge creation between scientists and local actors—to effectively 
bring science into action (Clark et al. 2016, van Kerkhoff & Pilbeam 2017; Wyborn 2015). In 
summary, this research recognizes that the availability of science does not necessarily imply that 
it will be utilized, and provides a means for better integrating science with decision making by 
restructuring the process by which science is produced. Taking this perspective from knowledge 
systems research may help to address the first concern mentioned at the end of the previous 
section—the need for a way to identify the extent to which different types of knowledge are 
incorporated into decision making. Assessments of whether or not LEK and science are 
incorporated into decision making can learn from this initial challenge within sustainability 
science, and utilize the knowledge systems approach subsequently developed to avoid it.  
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Researchers in STS have similarly focused on the relationship between science and 
society, but have taken a critical approach, rather than the normative approach of sustainability 
science (Wyborn 2015). Critical approaches in social science are concerned with power 
dynamics; STS recognizes science as socially constructed, rather than objective, and questions 
the assumption that science should be closely tied to decision making processes (van Kerkhoff & 
Pilbeam 2017). As Jasanoff (2004) puts it, “science and technology are indispensable to the 
expression and exercise of power…[they] operate, in short, as political agents.” The concept of 
civic epistemology was developed by Jasanoff (2005) to examine the social and cultural norms 
that form underlying patterns of socially-accepted knowledge processes; relating this to science, 
Jasanoff (2005) writes, “civic epistemology conceptualizes the credibility of science in 
contemporary political life as a phenomenon to be explained, not to be taken for granted” (p. 
250). This has been used to understand such phenomena as how citizens in different countries 
have received science on climate change, and why citizens do or do not consider it credible 
(Jasanoff 2005, Jasanoff 2011, van Kerkhoff & Pilbeam 2017). This work is especially relevant 
in non-Western contexts, where the application of science is intertwined with colonial processes 
that have damaged local communities, undermined indigenous cultures, and usurped customary 
authority (Tuhiwai Smith 2012, van Kerkhoff & Pilbeam 2017). Knowledge governance research 
proposes that seeing knowledge processes as culturally and politically situated in this way has 
the potential to inform socio-politically sensitive approaches to bringing science to practice in 
diverse communities (van Kerkhoff & Pilbeam 2017). This is where the knowledge governance 
approach has potential to contribute to the second concern mentioned above, regarding the need 
to give attention to power dynamics associated with whose knowledge is incorporated into 
decision. 
There are clear differences in approach and intention between STS and sustainability 
science research, but the potential for STS to offer insights for sustainability science research has 
inspired knowledge governance researchers to bring the two together. Van Kerkhoff and Pilbeam 
(2017) have drawn on both STS and sustainability science concepts to develop a conceptual 
framework for assessing knowledge governance in a given setting. Knowledge governance is 
conceptualized as having three nested levels: civic epistemology (what are the deep-seated 
patterns that structure the governance of knowledge?), knowledge systems (how do institutional 
arrangements shape the boundary between science and decision making?), and interventions (do 
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they conform to or challenge existing arrangements?) (van Kerkhoff and Pilbeam 2017). This 
framework draws from Jasanoff’s (2005) concept of civic epistemologies in STS research, and 
Cash et al.’s (2003) work on knowledge systems in sustainability science. The framework 
operates through a series of questions about rules, regulations, formal policies, and informal 
practices that govern the general relationships between knowledge and decision making and their 
implications for action (van Kerkhoff and Pilbeam 2017). The specific questions used in the 
framework are further discussed in the methods section of this proposal. 
The initial test of this framework by van Kerkhoff and Pilbeam (2017) was done through 
a case study of Palau, a Pacific nation consisting of a vast range of islands (~500). Like the 
Solomon Islands, Palau has intact customary systems, but is part of the region of Micronesia, 
west of Melanesia (van Kerkhoff and Pilbeam 2017). The study looked specifically at the Palau 
Protected Areas Network (PAN), a group of locally managed protected areas with a supporting 
“PAN Fund” organization that funds projects that meet a range of requirements based on 
Western-style, scientific approaches such as monitoring. The study of the PAN led to three 
general conclusions regarding the usefulness of the framework: (1) the interventions of PAN 
were reframed as “less about science and decision making, and more about the processes of 
accommodation and resistance between [customary and globalized] knowledge governance 
regimes,” (p. 35); (2) the approach itself prompted stakeholder reflection on their own 
institutional settings and on ideas for intervention; and (3) the framework was a useful practical 
guide to empirical analysis of the site, allowing for a specific focus on the knowledge-based 
elements of the complex relationship between science and decision making (van Kerkhoff and 
Pilbeam 2017).  The pilot study recommends further tests of the knowledge governance 
framework in development settings to refine the framework. In this research I test the model 
proposed by van Kerkhoff and Pilbeam (2017) by using it to address the need to consider 
knowledge more explicitly within adaptive governance analyses, especially in non-western 
contexts. To do this, I consider the FMA (2015) as an intervention within inshore fisheries in the 
Solomon Islands.  
 
2.3 Bringing the Knowledge Governance Lens to an Adaptive Governance Analysis 
As recognition of the importance of LEK and other types of knowledge beyond science 
emerges in governance scholarship, the relationship between these different kinds of knowledge 
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becomes central to adaptive governance, and the need for a critical approach to assessing 
governance grows (Rist et al. 2007, Wyborn 2015). As described above, environmental 
governance scholarship has drawn on past research on CBRM and LEK in order to identify the 
need for the incorporation of both science and LEK in an adaptive governance regime; there has 
not, however, been much discussion of how to define and recognize when this element of 
adaptive governance has emerged, or how to identify associated barriers or catalysts to achieving 
it in practice. Without a deeper discussion of what it means for this criterion to be met or how 
this can be achieved, governance scholarship risks making the mistake that the field of 
sustainability science seeks to avoid—the assumption that simply having knowledge available 
means it will be used. Perhaps the closest governance research gets to avoiding this is Armitage 
et al.’s (2009) mention that adaptive governance requires the “openness of participants to share 
and draw upon a plurality of knowledge systems of sources” (p. 101). Even this, however, does 
not lend much insight regarding how to get to that point or how to recognize when this has been 
achieved. The perspective of knowledge systems may help to address the first part of the 
problem, while the civic epistemologies lens may be able to provide insight into identifying 
cultural norms that may serve as barriers or catalysts to being able to draw on both types of 
knowledge. 
As discussed, sustainability science recognized that it is not safe to assume that 
connecting science to decision makers means that knowledge will actually be incorporated into 
decisions. Researchers in this field incorporated the concept of knowledge systems to reveal that 
knowledge must be perceived as relevant, salient, and legitimate before it is incorporated into 
decision making (Cash et al. 2003). Even this, however, failed to account for the STS concept 
that social and cultural norms shape the social acceptability of knowledge processes, until it was 
combined with the concept of knowledge systems in the development of the knowledge 
governance framework. Though this framework is recent, scholars have already been 
demonstrated that it is useful for uncovering the norms and rules that shape how science is used 
in decision making and suggested that it be tested in developing countries to reveal relationships 
between research-based knowledge and environmental and development programs (van Kerkhoff 
and Pilbeam 2017). Expanding this framework to examine not only science but also LEK makes 
it possible to add depth to suggestions that the integration of multiple types of knowledge 
(specifically LEK) are necessary in the emergence and development of adaptive governance. I 
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attempt this here by adapting van Kerkhoff and Pilbeam’s (2017) analytical framework for 
revealing knowledge governance arrangements for use in an investigation a potential transition to 
adaptive governance (see Sec. 3.4: Frameworks for Analysis). This analysis allows for the 
improved identification of knowledge-related barriers or catalysts for the emergence of adaptive 
governance.  
3 METHODOLOGY 
The approach, methods, and conceptual frameworks I use to realize my research 
objectives are described in this section, along with a detailed description of the study sites. My 
approach to this research is a case study, within which I employ data collection methods 
including policy analysis, semi-structured interviews, and participant observation to address my 
research questions.  
 
3.1 Approach: Case Study 
I chose an analytical case study approach to address my research questions based on its 
appropriateness for asking the “how” question regarding the relationship between knowledge 
governance and the emergence of adaptive governance. A case study is defined as an “empirical 
inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, 
especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin 
2009). An analytical case study involves building empirical evidence that tests a theoretical 
concept, allowing for generalization to other concrete situations and for developing new research 
directions (Yin 2009). This context-sensitive approach is useful for investigating the governance 
changes catalyzed by the Fisheries Management Act (2015) in real time, as it is implemented in 
the culturally complex setting of the Solomon Islands. It is also useful for detecting the 
knowledge governance arrangements related to small-scale fisheries governance as this requires 
a detailed inquiry into how specific individuals and groups interact with science and local 
ecological knowledge in their everyday work—an investigation of a phenomenon in context 
using multiple sources of data. I address my first and second research objectives by deploying 
the adaptive governance and knowledge governance frameworks described below at the national 
and local level in the Solomon Islands. Empirical evidence gathered in the capital city (national 
level) and in a rural fishing village (local level) is used to address the third objective of refining 
the theoretical connection between adaptive governance and knowledge governance. This 
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evidence is also used to pursue my fourth objective of refining the knowledge governance 
framework through testing its applicability to small-scale coastal management in a Melanesian 
PICT. I triangulate my findings through combining the data collection and analysis methods of 
policy analysis, semi-structured interviews, and participant observation to understand how 
inshore fisheries governance compares to elements of adaptive governance, and how knowledge 
is governed within this context. These methods are described in the next section, followed by a 
more detailed description of the case study location. The results of this analysis provide an 
empirical contribution to environmental governance and knowledge governance theory and may 
potentially apply to PICTs and similar contexts in regions other than the Pacific. 
 
3.1.1 Focus for Analysis: The FMA (2015) as a Potential Catalyst for Adaptive Governance 
My analysis of the potential emergence of adaptive inshore fisheries governance focuses 
on the FMA (2015). I selected the Solomon Islands, and the FMA (2015) in particular, because 
this PICT presents an unusual opportunity to assess the potential for adaptive governance in a 
context where LEK and western science are both incorporated into inshore fisheries governance 
(Aswani and Hamilton 2004, Bennett 2012). Evaluating the potential for adaptive governance in 
this context is especially important because, as with other PICTs, the Solomon Islands is a 
developing nation with highly resource-dependent communities, and is likely to feel the negative 
impacts of climate change in the near future—it is imperative that actors find ways to govern 
their resources to adapt to these changes (Green et al. 2006, Schwarz et al. 2011).  
 My preliminary analysis indicated that this new Act may reflect some key elements of 
adaptive governance. Specifically, the Act contains a provision for local communities to submit 
plans to the government that detail local rules for fisheries management; if these plans are 
approved, these rules gain the status of by-laws enforceable by national police and the national 
court system (s.18). In addition, this Act fits within a broader movement towards CBRM in the 
Pacific resulting from recognition that centralized systems have failed (Aswani et al. 2007, 
Aswani and Sabetian 2009), but is unique as one of few instances where this approach is 
incorporated directly into national policy in a PICT. The CBRM approach and its recognition 
within national policy represents a potential opportunity for adaptive governance to emerge, as it 
appears to reflect some of the key elements needed for this to occur. Among these elements are 
inclusive participation in decision making, polycentric decision making arrangements, and 
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perhaps improved bioregional fit, among others. These elements are investigated in depth in the 
AG portion of the analysis. 
In addition to potentially reflecting some elements of AG, the FMA (2015) fits within the 
broader context of a hybrid inshore fisheries governance system where both formal, western-
style government, and long-standing, customary tenure systems are present. As discussed in 
Situating the FMA (2015), the Solomon Islands provide a rich cultural context where LEK is 
prevalent at the local scale and acknowledged, alongside western science, at the national scale. 
This provides an opportunity to test the KG framework within a broader AG analysis in a place 
where it is especially important to ensure that the different knowledges available are drawn on 
and be attentive to the power dynamics about which types of knowledge (and which knowledge-
holders) are included in decision making processes. By bringing the knowledge governance lens 
into an AG analysis of this SES, I aim to contribute to a better understanding of what culturally-
aware suggestions for adaptive governance might look like in this context. 
 
3.2 Methods 
This section describes the specific methods of data collection used within the case study 
approach. 
 
3.2.1 Policy analysis 
 I conducted a policy analysis of two recently passed Acts of Parliament in order to assess 
the extent to which current transitions in governance reflect elements of adaptive governance and 
to investigate knowledge governance arrangements at the national scale. I focused primarily on 
the Fisheries Management Act (2015), as this is central to the case study, but also analyzed the 
Protected Areas Act (2010) because it is an important component of the context in which the 
FMA (2015) was developed. These Acts contain complementary provisions that allow NGOs 
and community members to designate their conservation or tenure areas as nationally recognized 
protected areas via the PAA (2010) or fisheries management areas via the FMA (2015). 
Nationally recognized protected areas are intended for areas of national significance, while 
marine managed areas are generally for giving legal backing to areas already actively managed 
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by local residents.2 I used deductive coding to examine the extent to which marine resource laws 
speak to the concepts of adaptive governance and knowledge governance (guided by Table 1 and 
Table 2).  
 
3.2.2 Semi-structured interviews & participant observation 
Semi-structured interviews and participant observation were employed as part of a 
triangulation strategy, which tests the validity of the data by drawing on multiple sources to see 
if results conflict with one another (Creswell 2007). The questions and key themes within the 
adaptive governance and knowledge governance frameworks were explored through semi-
structured interviews at the national and local level. At both levels I used purposive and snowball 
sampling techniques to select study participants.  
National level interviewees were selected based on their significant engagement with 
community-based resource management, and who have engaged with creating or implementing 
the FMA (2015), or who were familiar with the Act and had experience with its counterpart, the 
PAA 2010). I defined significant engagement as hands-on experience working directly with local 
communities on the development of management plans, often, but not always, for submission 
under the PAA (2010) or FMA (2015). Initial participants were selected based on 
recommendations from key informants; these informants included two researchers with extensive 
academic and professional experience in the Solomon Islands and one MFMR professional 
member. Subsequent participants were identified through snowball sampling from 
recommendations by the first five participants; this method is used to identify hard to reach or 
hidden populations of people (Salganik and Heckathorn 2004). These initial participants were 
asked to suggest individuals who had a key role in the Act, as well as individuals who were 
likely to hold a perspective substantially different from their own. The national level participants 
were primarily government professionals and NGO professionals interviewed in-person in 
Honiara over a two-week period. There were five national-level interviewees that were not based 
in Honiara: three researchers and one NGO professional were based in Australia, and one lawyer 
(policy-maker) was based in Rome. These interviews were conducted via phone or Skype, except 
for one in-person interview with a researcher who was based in Canberra. 
                                               
2 Information from interviews with government and NGO professionals at the national level. 
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Local level interviews were conducted during the nine weeks I spent on Turupu Island 
near Mbili village. The majority of interviews were done during the final four weeks of my stay, 
allowing participants to first become familiar with me, and allowing me to better understand 
islander’s pijin and their accent when speaking English. As with the national level, I relied on 
key informants and selected local level participants using purposive and snowball sampling. The 
key informants included the village pastor and two rangers—rangers are locals who have been 
trained in basic ecological concepts and resource monitoring techniques, usually by NGOs 
working in the provinces.3 A workshop on the process for submitting a plan under the FMA 
(2015) was conducted by government professionals a week before my arrival. I selected 
participants based on their likelihood of being highly involved, likely as a committee member, in 
the process of submitting a plan under the FMA (2015) if the community should choose to do so. 
To do this I considered a combination of factors: (1) their participation in the workshop4 on the 
FMA (2015); (2) a high level engagement with fishing activities; and (3) their position of 
leadership within the community. All participants met at least two of these criteria.  
I supplemented interviews with participant observation at the local level. This method 
allows for real-world observations that allows for otherwise inaccessible opportunities for data 
collection and can allow for more of an “insider” perspective (Yin 2014). In this case study I 
used informal observations of fishing behavior and informal conversations with residents during 
fieldwork. I lightly participated marine management and everyday life by living in one of the 
village satellite communities for 9 weeks and through volunteering on the local pastor’s coral 
farming project. The project was funded by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 
Small Grants Program. I volunteered three to four days a week to help with the creation of small 
coral farms, which were located at six different sites throughout Marovo Lagoon. I assisted with 
writing up project progress and site descriptions based on interviews with owners of these sites 
in addition to helping with the collection and placement of coral on small trestles in shallow 
areas. I wrote memos about relevant events and conversations. The challenge of participant 
observation is the potential for biases produced through my involvement in events, with 
participants potentially changing their behavior due to being observed (Yin 2014, Babbie 2016). 
                                               
3 Information mentioned in several interviews with government and NGO professionals at the national level. 
4 One participant had attended a different workshop on similar fisheries management topics; I decided to include 
this because the participant was able to reflect on the value of science and LEK despite being less familiar with the 
FMA (2015) itself.  
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This is especially a risk in this situation, where my ethnicity and race drew attention and likely 
influenced behavior. To mitigate this, I reflected frequently on my role, noting in memos where I 
might have influenced data. I also emphasized confidentiality in conversations and did not take 
an enforcement position regarding a nearby protected area, which I could have done by reporting 
activities to the island owner or the manager of the lodge where I stayed. Additionally, I 
generally did not place myself in prominent roles (e.g. assisting the pastor with his project 
instead of leading project coordination or management). In all cases I sought to do ethical 
research by being clear about my role as a researcher and the intentions of my project (Babbie 
2016). Some evidence that this was effective were study participants frequently confiding in me 
regarding opinions on other residents that they knew I was connected to; residents also 
frequently broke the protected area rules while I was present but the customary leader 
responsible for the protected area was absent. 
Data collected during interviews and participant observation was first coded deductively 
for evidence of the presence of elements of adaptive governance and knowledge governance 
using guidance outlined in Tables 1 and 2 respectively, and then coded inductively to detect 
other concepts or negative cases. Negative case testing involves drawing an initial hypothesis 
from the data, then revisiting the data to detect any instances where this hypothesis is 
contradicted, and revise conclusions as necessary (Babbie 2016). Results from this analysis are 
used to address my first four objectives: to consider the extent to which elements of adaptive 
governance are present, to consider how the knowledge governance framework can be improved, 
to build theory on the relationship between knowledge governance and the emergence of 
adaptive governance, and to suggest revisions to the knowledge governance framework itself. 
These frameworks will be described in more detail following the below description of the study 
location and context. 
 
3.3 Building Context 
3.3.1  Welkam to Solomon Islands  
The Solomon Islands are a part of the Melanesian region and sit just northeast of 
Australia. The islands rank sixth in the world for biocultural diversity (Cohen et al. 2015). The 
variety of species found in the rainforests, mangroves, and reefs of this region is rivaled only by 
the diversity of cultures and languages (~120) that characterize the communities of this Pacific 
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Island Nation (PIN) (PacLII (2001), Green et al. 2006, Cohen et al. 2015). The impacts of 
climate change on islands in this region include rising sea levels, ocean acidification, and an 
increasing frequency of destructive cyclones (Green et al. 2006, Carpenter et al. 2008). At the 
same time, processes of globalization and the growth of a market-based economy in the Pacific 
catalyze extractive industries like logging and offshore fishing, which are leading to 
unsustainable land use and overexploitation of fisheries and other resources (Macintyre and 
Foale 2004, Albert et al. 2014, Jupiter et al. 2014).  
 
3.3.1.1 Ecological Context 
A marine survey of the Solomon Islands conducted by The Nature Conservancy (TNC) in 
2004 revealed 485 known coral species, and an additional nine that were unknown to coral 
experts (Green et al. 2006). The surveyors also recorded ten species of seagrass (representing 
80% of the known species in the region) and 1,019 fish species. Collectively, this survey 
demonstrated the extremely high biodiversity of the archipelago, earning it the designation of 
belonging to the Coral Triangle, the global center of marine diversity (Green et al. 2006). The 
Solomon Islands are now the bottom right corner of the triangle, which stretches up to the 
Philippines and west across the Southeast Pacific to Indonesia (Green et al. 2006, Veron et al. 
2009). Unlike other areas of the Coral Triangle, the reefs and marine ecosystems of the Solomon 
Islands are relatively intact (Roberts et al. 2002, Lovell et al. 2004).  
Despite the current health of these ecosystems, concerns are being raised about their 
future. The Solomon Islands is a young nation that gained its independence from Britain in 1978, 
and it is now growing swiftly. The population growth rate in the country is 2.3%, with more than 
half of the current population under the age of 25 (Asian Development Bank (ADB) 2014). 
Estimates of the sustainable production capacity for country’s coastal fisheries hover between 
11,150 tons to 13,800 tons, but the annual catch required to ensure the protein needs of Solomon 
Islanders are met is estimated at 18,000 tons, and is expected to increase to 29,900 tons by 2030 
(ADB 2014). It is therefore likely that overfishing is beginning to occur; declines in the catch 
rates of parrot fish, sea cucumber, and giant clams have already been detected, primarily as a 
result of increasing use of technology by fishers (Sabetian and Foale 2006, ADB 2014). 
 
3.3.1.2 Governance Actors 
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The Solomon Islands is a parliamentary democracy under a constitutional monarchy 
(Queen Elizabeth II), and follows English common law. The country is part of the 
Commonwealth as a result of its previous status as a United Kingdom protectorate; the nation 
gained independence in 1978. The official languages of the country are Melanesian pidgin and 
English, with approximately 120 indigenous languages spoken across the archipelago (PacLII 
2001). The Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources (MFMR) is the formal government body 
given responsibility for the management of inshore fisheries. The Fisheries Management Act 
(1998) gives the nine provincial governments primary responsibility for the management of reef, 
inshore, and freshwater fisheries, but this is supported by MFMR; the Fisheries Management Act 
(2015) upheld this allocation of responsibility. Responsibility for formally registered locally 
managed marine managed areas (LMMAs) falls under the jurisdiction of MFMR, while 
responsibility for marine protected areas (MPAs) is split between MFMR and the Ministry of 
Environment, Climate Change, and Disaster Management (MECCDM), depending on the 
purpose of the MPA. MPAs designed to conserve overall biodiversity fall under the jurisdiction 
of the MECCDM, while those focused on the management or protection of specific species fall 
under the jurisdiction of MFMR. Within the MFMR, and under the influence of regional 
collaborations like the Coral Triangle Initiative (see Sec.: 3.3.2.4),  a new Community-Based 
Resource Management (CBRM) unit has been developed in the last five years; this unit will be 
responsible for processing applications for LMMAs and MPAs.5  
The combination of relative ecological health with rapidly changing fishing practices and 
the growth of the fishing industry has spurred a wave of conservation efforts in the style of what 
might be called “last best place” conservation, meaning that the interests of environmental 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are motivated by a desire to preserve a place because it 
is still healthy, rather than by a need to restore an area that has been lost (Green et al. 2006). A 
wide array of NGOs, including TNC, World Wildlife Fund (WWF), Conservation International 
(CI), and The WorldFish Center (WFC), have entered the Solomon Islands with the intention of 
seeing to it that the biodiversity and local livelihoods of this unique country are not lost (Green et 
al. 2006, Walter and Hamilton 2014). In doing so, these NGOs have met with existing customary 
systems of resource management, and seem to be in the process of learning to take a community-
based approach that is tailored to these existing management practices (Govan et al. 2011, Goby 
                                               
5 Information from interviews with government and NGO professionals at the national level. 
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et al. 2012, Walter and Hamilton 2014). These actors have become a critical part of inshore 
fisheries and environmental governance overall in the Solomon Islands, providing a capacity for 
on-the-ground work that the government currently lacks.6 
While the government has formal responsibility for marine management, and the NGOs 
provide capacity for implementation through informal and formal partnership arrangements, 
inshore fisheries and coastal areas are owned by tribes at the local level. This ownership operates 
through long-standing customary marine tenure systems (CMT) and is formally recognized in the 
Solomon Island Constitution (1978). The next section provides a closer look at these systems and 
their relevance to marine management.  
 
3.3.1.3 Customary Marine Tenure Systems 
In 1978, well-known tropical marine biologist Robert Johannes wrote a seminal piece 
describing traditional Oceania resource management methods, and predicted their imminent 
demise. He opens his piece with a heavy heart: 
The following is an account of the rise and decline of a millennia-old system of 
controlled exploitation of marine resources that incorporates a wisdom 
Westerners are only now beginning to appreciate after having brought about its 
widespread decay. (Johannes 1978, p. 349) 
Johannes (1978) blamed this decay on the introduction of money economies, the 
breakdown of traditional authority, and the imposition of new laws by colonial powers. To the 
surprise of many, including Johannes himself, these customary systems survived a tumultuous 
journey of colonization and decolonization and are still in existence today (Johannes 2002, 
Aswani 2011). Johannes returned to the Pacific more than twenty years after his initial study and 
found many systems still intact, which he suggests is the result of local people recognizing the 
decline of their resources, growing cultural pride, and national independence leading to laws that 
back customary systems (2002). This holds true for the Solomon Islands, where the vast majority 
of land is held in customary ownership, and land ownership can only be held by Solomon Island 
citizens (Solomon Islands Constitution XI, 110; see also Lam 1998). 
                                               
6 Information from interviews with government and NGO professionals at the national level. 
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Johannes (1978) and others (e.g. Aswani et al. 2007) have argued that customary 
practices in many ways reflect adaptive characteristics useful for conserving and sustaining 
resources, while others have cautioned that these systems have not been under enough pressure 
or shocks to be able to detect if they are truly adaptive, and that in fact these systems are more 
oriented around maintaining social relationships (see Foale et al. 2011). Regardless, more recent 
research and personal observation indicate that the strength of these systems vary substantially 
across the archipelago, with some communities exhibiting the signs of decay that Johannes 
feared would come (e.g. Schwarz et al. 2011’s discuss the erosion of social cohesion). This 
phenomenon, and its clash with NGOs, has generated a large body of academic and grey 
literature on the topics of customary marine tenure (CMT), NGO strategies for community-based 
resource management (CBRM), and the challenges and lessons learned from bringing the two 
together (e.g. Hviding and Baines 1994, Foale et al. 2011, Goby et al 2012, Walter and Hamilton 
2014).  
Many NGOs did not anticipate the complexity that customary systems add when doing 
conservation work in this context (i.e. conflicts that arise between biodiversity and livelihood 
priorities), leading to several initial failed attempts at CBRM efforts by NGOs (Walter and 
Hamilton 2014). This has led to documentation of lessons learned (e.g. Alexander et al. 2011), 
and a general desire by NGOs to share these lessons amongst national level governance actors.7 
These customary systems and history of NGO involvement set the context into which the FMA 
(2015) entered. The lessons learned from CBRM and the role of NGOs in implementing these 
types of projects are critical context for understanding interview responses to questions about the 
FMA (2015); this comes up in the Experimentation and Learning section and elsewhere in the 
results of this study. 
 
3.3.2 Situating the FMA (2015): Political and Legal Context for the Act 
3.3.2.1 Local Courts, Customary Law, & English Common Law 
The Solomon Islands Government exists at the intersection of customary Melanesian 
systems of governance and the British-style, parliamentary democracy system. This means that 
the Constitution and other national policies must navigate between these systems, which includes 
                                               
7 Reflections from several NGO interviews at the national level.  
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identifying whether English Common Law or the customary system dominates when there is a 
conflict between the two. This is the case across the Pacific region, and each PICT reconciles the 
differences between these systems in their own way (Pulea 1993). In the Solomon Islands, the 
Constitution states that the principles of common law and equity apply, except in the following 
situations: “a) they are inconsistent with this constitution or any Act of Parliament, b) they are 
not appropriate to the circumstances of Solomon Islands from time to time, or c) in their 
application to any particular matter, they are inconsistent with customary law applying in respect 
of that matter” (Constitution, Schedule 3, (2)(1)(a-c)). Thus, customary law comes before 
common law in the Solomon Islands, with the Constitution having supremacy over both (Pulea 
1993). Although this is established, it can be difficult to navigate in practice because customary 
systems are by nature unwritten; Parliament is given responsibility for providing for the ways in 
which customary law must be recognized (Pulea 1993). At the local level, the Local Courts Act 
authorizes customary courts to hear claims related to customary law and to resolve disputes over 
customary land. Court justices do not need to be legally trained but must be knowledgeable in 
customary law (Pulea 1993); in the east part of Marovo Lagoon, residents indicated that the 
courts were made up of local chiefs. The extent to which these courts engage in marine resource 
disputes appears to be relatively undocumented, although one study found that the courts have 
been used to deal with disputes over the distribution of baitfish royalties paid by tuna boats 
(Ruddle et al. 1992). 
 
3.3.2.2 Previous Fisheries Acts & Relevant Changes in 2015 
There have been two national fisheries acts prior to the FMA (2015), the first passed in 
1972 and the second passed in 1998. According to Pulea (1993), the FMA (1972) did not make 
any reference to the preservation of fishing rights by Solomon Islanders nor did it recognize 
customary rights, instead leaving this to other Acts (e.g. the Provincial Government Act 1981). 
The FMA (1998) does recognize customary rights explicitly, but they are mainly mentioned in 
regard to commercial fishing; the Act ensures that commercial vessels that violate customary 
fishing rights can be ordered to pay compensation to the rights-holders by the courts (Part 2, 
s.12). Customary rights are also briefly mentioned in a section about the development of fisheries 
management plans by the Director, who must consult with relevant customary rights holders, and 
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in a section that states that provincial ordinances can provide for the registration of customary 
fishing rights and their boundaries.  
The new FMA (2015) repeals and replaces the FMA (1998). This Act was developed 
over the course of a decade. The development process was delayed by changes in leadership, but 
ultimately was passed after pressure was applied from the European Union to improve tuna 
fisheries practices. The process ultimately included consultations with foreign researchers with 
extensive experience in the Solomon Islands, and with government and NGO professionals; most 
meetings and consultations were held in the final years of the Act’s development (~2012-2014).  
The new Act appears to build on the recognition of customary rights that was introduced 
in the FMA (1998). The recognition of customary rights and the requirement for commercial 
fishers to pay compensation if they are violated is retained in the new Act under Section 21. A 
novel feature of the FMA (2015), and the focus of this study, is the introduction of fisheries 
management plans that can be initiated by or on behalf of local communities, rather than just by 
the Director, as a means of providing local communities access to the use of formal government 
enforcement (s.18). The Director can still initiate plans at the local, provincial, or national level, 
in consultation with customary owners and the provincial government as appropriate, but is no 
longer the only person who can do so (FMA (2015) s.17). The requirements for the content of 
fisheries management plans are the same for plans initiated by the Director or by communities 
(FMA (2015) s.17-18 & Second Schedule), and are much more detailed than in the FMA (1998, 
s.8). The new Act requires more detailed information about the habitat relevant to the fishery 
under consideration, and unlike the previous Act it additionally requires information about the 
process for how the management plans will be enforced and monitored.  
 
3.3.2.3 Other Relevant Policies, Acts & Ordinances 
The following Acts and ordinances were occasionally mentioned in interviews and 
provide additional context for understanding the context of the FMA (2015). They are briefly 
described here primarily in regard to how they relate to the FMA (2015).   
 
Provincial Government Act (1997) 
 This Act designated the jurisdictions (including marine) and administration of the nine 
provinces. This act aligns with the Constitution in recognizing customary rights (s.3(7)). These 
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provinces are in turn given primary responsibility for the development and management of the 
fisheries in their waters under the FMA (2015).  
 
Western Province Provincial Fisheries Ordinance (2011) 
 This ordinance established a process for registering marine areas at the provincial level 
using management plans, which is similar in principle to Section 18 in the FMA (2015). Either 
environmental NGOs or “customary groups” can apply for an area to be declared as a marine 
protected area (s.28 (2)). Some of the same stakeholders (e.g. NGOs, researchers) were involved 
in the development of both this ordinance and the FMA (2015). 
 
Protected Areas Act (2010) 
The Protected Areas Act (PAA) (2010) was in development at the same time as the FMA 
(2015). According to government and NGO participants they were not intentionally designed to 
complement each other, but some attention was given to clarifying the role of the FMA (2015) 
versus the PAA (2010) both before and after it was passed. Like the FMA (2015), the PAA 
(2010) allows for communities or NGOs to submit management plans for approval at the 
national level; if approved, the plans gain the status of by-law. The PAA (2010) applies to both 
terrestrial and marine areas, whereas the FMA (2015) applies only to marine resources and to 
fisheries in particular (rather than the broader habitat, although that must be acknowledge in the 
plans). This was still a point of confusion amongst participants, and some clarification was 
provided during interviews with government professionals. The differences as described in 
interviews are discussed below.  
The FMA (2015) is focused on strengthening enforcement for rules around resource use, 
while the PAA (2010) aims to protect areas with biodiversity of national significance. The PAA 
(2010) is focused on habitat protection, while the FMA (2010) is focused on the enforcement of 
local rules. Both acts seem to have potential to be effective against foreign industry interests, but 
perhaps not against infringements by local residents. By adding the FMA (2015) alongside the 
PAA (2010), communities that may not possess areas of national biodiversity significance will 
now have a means of protecting their marine (but not terrestrial) areas from extractive industry. 
Several participants directly compared the FMA (2015) to the PAA (2010), the latter of which 
they found to have an arduous registration process for protected areas that similarly involves the 
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submission of local level management plans. Participants mentioned that submitting 
management plans under the PAA (2010) often took many iterations, with the first protected area 
finally declared in 2017, seven years after the act was passed and an initial plan was first 
submitted. Many were concerned that the same difficulties of submission would occur with the 
FMA (2015), and that even if there was success, there would be little means for the government 
to actually enforce rules. 
 
National Strategy for the Management of Inshore Fisheries and Marine Resources 2010-12 
This policy describes the vision and principles for meeting “national and international 
obligations towards sustainable management and utilization of inshore resources.” It is intended 
as a ‘living document’ with a two-year review process, but this seems to be the most recent 
iteration of the strategy. One of the five “pillars” for achieving the vision of “sustainable and 
secure inshore fisheries and aquatic resources by 2020” is CBRM. The strategy emphasizes a 
“people-centered” approach to fisheries management, and “recognizes that community-based 
initiatives will be the driving force of sustainable economic development in the inshore marine 
resource sector.” The development of community-based management plans and promoting 
livelihood diversification are two main strategies set forth under the CBRM pillar. The content of 
this strategy suggests an enabling environment for the creation of the provision for community-
driven plans in the FMA (2015).  
 
3.3.2.4 Relevant International Conventions, Initiatives, and Agreements 
Coral Triangle Initiative & National Plan of Action 
The Coral Triangle Initiative on Coral Reefs, Fisheries, and Food Security (CTI) is a 
multi-lateral partnership formed in 2007 between the governments of Indonesia, Malaysia, Papua 
New Guinea, the Philippines, Solomon Islands, and Timore-Leste. The partnership was 
developed to address shared issues such as food security, climate change, and marine 
biodiversity (CTI-CFF 2018). Each country involved in the initiative has its own “National Plan 
of Action” (NPOA) to meet agreed upon objectives. The Solomon Islands NPOA aims to have 
“50% of Solomon Island coastal, watershed, and inshore area under improved management 
through CBRM and [Integrated Coastal Management] approaches by 2015. It seeks to achieve 
this by making CBRM as the “core” of its national strategy to “deliver food security, adaptive 
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capacity (climate change and other pressures), conservation of target or threatened species and 
habitats.” The plan outlines the intention to establish a system of CBRM appropriate to Solomon 
Islands, including long term support systems at the national and provincial level. This sets the 
stage for the FMA (2015) and links it to the regional concerns expressed through the CTI 
partnership. 
 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species 
The Solomon Islands have been party to the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species (CITES) since 2007. The Wildlife Protection and Management Act (2017) 
was passed to enable the government to fully implement the requirements of CITES. However, 
marine species were covered in the FMA (2015) in regard to the import and export of live fish 
(Part 7 (59)(5)). At the local level there does not seem to be any explicit connection between 
CITES and the creation of community management plans, although this might come into play if 
endangered species like turtle or dugong were addressed in the plan. The plans under the FMA 
(2015) are primarily focused on fisheries, whereas the plans under the PAA (2010) are more 
concerned with biodiversity significance; this seems like the more likely place for CITES to 
interact with local level governance.  
 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
In 2007 the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) 
was adopted by the General Assembly to affirm the equality and rights of indigenous peoples in 
response to a history of injustice towards these peoples (General Assembly 2008). Although the 
Solomon Islands was absent for this adoption, and is yet to endorse the UNDRIP (Cultural 
Survival 2015), some of the principles of the declaration are reflected in both the Solomon 
Islands Constitution (1978) and the FMA (2015). Both policies recognize the customary rights of 
indigenous people to possess and manage their land. However, while indigenous rights 
organizations like Cultural Survival praise the Solomon Islands Government for this 
acknowledgment, they criticize the government for being lax about protecting these rights in 
some instances, such as allowing extractive industries like logging without consent from local 
peoples (Cultural Survival 2015). The government’s response to this criticism remains to be 
seen, but has potential to influence the implementation of the FMA (2015) and other natural 
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resource policies given the close tie between indigenous rights and natural resource management 
in this context.  
 
3.3.3 Specific Study Sites: 
3.3.3.1 National Level Site: Honiara 
Honiara is the capitol city of the Solomon Islands, located in the Guadalcanal Province. It 
has a population of approximately 65,000 and is the only city in the country with a population 
greater than 10,000 (SIG Census 2009). The Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources 
(MFMR) and the Ministry of Environment, Climate Change, and Disaster Management 
(MECCDM) are both housed within the city. This is also where the national offices for all of the 
major international environmental NGOs operating in the country, including WorldFish, World 
Wildlife Fund (WWF), and The Nature Conservancy (TNC), along with the only locally-based 
NGO, the Solomon Islands Community Conservation Partnership (SICCP). The development of 
the national Fisheries Management Act (2015) took place in Honiara, led by the MFMR and 
involving consultations with NGO professionals.  
 
3.3.3.2 Local Level Site: Marovo Lagoon, Western Province 
The Western Province has a population of approximately 77,000, making it the third most 
populated of the nine provinces (SIG Census 2009). Marovo Lagoon is a 750 km2 expanse of 
inshore sea protected by a double barrier reef in the Northeast part of the Western Province of 
the Solomon Islands (Albert et al. 2014). This lagoon follows the coasts of three volcanic islands, 
and is home to approximately 10,000 Solomon Islanders that speak five different languages 
(Hviding & Baines 1994). A relatively intact traditional system of marine tenure operates in 
some parts of the region, in which ownership and resource rights are determined based on 
connection to local kinship groups (Hviding & Baines 1994). The coral species of the lagoon 
were surveyed during a nation-wide assessment by TNC, and were found to be amongst the most 
biodiverse in the world (Green et al. 2006). Though parts of the lagoon at one point suffered 
from sedimentation as the result of logging in adjacent watersheds, cessation of logging has led 
to the recovery of reef health in some areas, but not all (Albert et al. 2014).  
My research was conducted in Mbili Village, located near Bunikalo, the first ferry port 
arrived at when coming from Honiara. Mbili is a small fishing village in the Southeast portion of 
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Marovo Lagoon with a local governance system consisting of a community chair and leadership 
committee, though the chief is still part of the community and appears to be responsible for 
assisting with the settlement of tenure area disputes. Many villages in the Solomon Islands are in 
a period of transition from the chief having authority to local committees with democratically 
selected chairs; though Melanesian chiefly systems always been more collective and less 
hierarchical than the structures characteristic of Polynesia, these systems seem to be dissolving in 
favor of more democratic approaches to governance. The satellite “villages” (consisting of one 
family and their extended relatives) in Figure 1 are Tibarra (1A), home to the chief’s family, and 
Turupu (1B), owned by family that paid compensation to the chief in order to obtain ownership 
(an apparently unusual mechanism for obtaining customary tenure rights in the Western 
Province). I spent nine weeks at a small lodge located on Turupu and conducted interviews with 
fishermen and village leaders in Mbili and on Tibarra and Turupu. To integrate with the village I 
participated in Mbili village activities including occasional attendance the Seventh Day 
Adventist (SDA) church and some participation in daily volleyball practice sessions.  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Location of study site within Marovo Lagoon, Western Province. Marovo Lagoon is 
the entire area between Vangunu Island and the barrier reefs on the East side of the map; this 
lagoon also stretches several hundred kilometers further north (750km2 area). Local level 
interviews were conducted at Mbili village (red star) and two satellite villages (red dots), Tibarra 
(A) and Turupu (B).  
 
3.4 Frameworks for Data Analysis 
B 
A 
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Initially, I adapted a conceptual framework for identifying elements of the emergence of 
adaptive governance primarily from the principles outlined by Huitema et al. (2009) and Chaffin 
et al. (2014), but also augmented with some criteria identified from the broader body of adaptive 
governance literature. The conceptual framework I use to describe knowledge governance 
arrangements is based on van Kerkhoff and Pilbeam (2017), but has been modified in two 
general ways: (1) I expanded the framework to investigate how local knowledge, in addition to 
science, is governed; (2) I also tailored toward examining the governance of knowledge in policy 
and policy-making processes, which differs slightly from its original use for application to 
conservation interventions. 
 
3.4.1 Identifying Characteristics of Adaptive Governance 
To identify the emergence of adaptive governance I adapted a framework based on 
criteria described in key studies of adaptive governance (Table 1). This framework was used to 
guide the policy analysis and interview analysis described later in this section. This framework 
allows me to characterize governance arrangements in a “snapshot” at a single point in time 
based on qualitative data collected through semi-structured interviews and document analysis. 
The key characteristics identified include: bioregional fit, clear boundaries, nested polycentricity, 
enforcement and conflict resolution, inclusive participation, leadership, experimentation and 
learning, and the inclusion of multiple types of knowledge. The suggestions for clear boundaries 
and for enforcement and conflict resolution were recently proposed as “candidate” institutional 
design principles that need further testing. The recommendation for well-defined boundaries is 
motivated by the sense that this can helpfully clarify legal and institutional jurisdictions (De Caro 
et al. 2017). However, research in CMT suggests that there may be benefits to having fuzzier 
boundaries because this allows tenure holders to be more flexible in Pacific contexts—the pros 
and cons of clarifying boundaries are discussed further in Elements of Adaptive Governance. 
 
Table 1. Framework for analyzing adaptive governance arrangements. 
AG Characteristics Description 
Bioregional Fit (Huitema et al. 2009) •Do political jurisdictions mirror or align closely with 
ecological boundaries? 
•Do nested governance jurisdictions resemble nested 
ecological boundaries? 
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3.4.2 Characterizing Knowledge Governance 
Van Kerkhoff and Pilbeam’s (2017) framework for assessing knowledge governance in a 
given context consists of three nested layers: civic epistemology, knowledge systems, and 
interventions (Figure 2). This was developed to investigate the role of science in decision making 
but has been tested in a context where LEK is 
also prominent; here I adjust the framework to 
explicitly address both science and LEK. The 
layer of civic epistemology draws on STS 
studies and its representation as the broadest 
layer reflects the idea that epistemology 
underlies all knowledge processes that occur 
during a given intervention (i.e., a conservation 
Experimentation and Learning 
(Huitema et al. 2009, Folke et al. 
2005) 
•Are AM processes enabled or supported? 
•Is experimentation and failure acceptable? 
Inclusive Participation (Huitema et al. 
2009, De Caro et al. 2017 citing 
Ostrom (1990, 2010)) 
•Do individual participants have a high level of access 
to decision making processes/venues?; do they 
influence decisions? 
•Are participants representative of relevant 
stakeholder groups? 
•What groups/interests lack capacity to be at the table? 
Inclusive of multiple types of 
knowledge (Armitage et al. 2009) 
•Can both expert and non-expert knowledge play 
productive and essential roles in problem 
identification, framing, and analysis? 
Nested Polycentricity (Huitema et al. 
2009, Folke et al. 2005) 
•Are legitimate decisions made in multiple locations? 
•Are decisions are made at different levels depending 
on relevance to each level (with some overlap and 
ideally some coordination)? 
•Regional and national policy supports collaborative 
management (Armitage et al. 2009) 
Well-defined boundaries (De Caro et 
al. 2017 citing Ostrom (1990, 2010)) 
•political, institutional, eco boundaries well defined so 
that legal and institutional jurisdiction is clear 
Internal and external enforcement and 
conflict resolution (De Caro et al. 
2017 citing Ostrom (1990, 2010)) 
•In addition to external monitoring, enforcement, and 
conflict resolution, are there also internal mechanisms 
within a locality that can be leveraged before seeking 
external help? 
Leadership •Key leaders to "champion" process (Armitage et al 
2009) 
•Empathetic leaders (Gosnell et al. 2017) 
Figure 2. Three-layer conceptual framework of 
knowledge governance as described by van 
Kerkhoff and Pilbeam (2017). 
Figure 1. Three-layer conceptual framework 
of knowledge governance  as described by 
van Kerkhoff and Pilbeam (2017). 
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project or policy). The middle knowledge systems layer draws on sustainability science and 
focuses on the institutions in place that shape the role of science during an intervention. A 
knowledge system is defined as “a network of actors connected by social relationships, formal or 
informal, that dynamically combined knowing, doing, and learning to bring about specific 
actions for sustainable development” (van Kerkhoff and Szlezak 2016). In other words, these 
actors mediate the relationship between science and action, and this layer looks at the 
institutional arrangements through which they do that. The final layer focuses specifically on the 
intervention at hand and examines the extent to which it accommodates or challenges existing 
knowledge governance arrangements (van Kerkhoff & Pilbeam 2017). The framework also 
includes specific questions to assess how each layer plays out in a given context. This original 
framework is provided in Appendix A. 
The questions posed within this framework required some revisions in order to adapt the 
framework to investigate the governance of multiple types of knowledge during decision making 
in the development and initial implementation of the Fisheries Management Act (2015). The 
revised framework presented below was initially developed during an 8-week fellowship at the 
Australian National University, during which I was mentored by Dr. van Kerkhoff. The 
framework is organized with themes on the left related to civic epistemologies and then 
knowledge systems. These themes are defined in the second column, while the third column 
considers the FMA (2015) policy as an intervention and includes questions used to analyze how 
the Act aligns or does not align with existing knowledge governance arrangements.  
Table 2. Key themes derived from Van Kerkhoff & Pilbeam (2017). 
Themes  Description and application of themes Intervention: How does the FMA policy 
conform or challenge existing 
arrangements? 
Civic Epistemologies 
Dominant style 
of knowledge 
making  
Defines who has public endorsement to 
generate accepted knowledge on certain 
issues. The dominant methods for 
information to become knowledge and 
generate action? 
What information is required and accepted 
into the management plans? How is this 
information likely to be generated and by 
whom?  
Public 
accountability 
How knowledge is tested, and in so 
doing, deemed credible and trustworthy. 
What government standards are set for 
evaluating whether or not a plan is working or 
needs to be reviewed? 
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Effectiveness How the benefits or outcomes of 
knowledge are demonstrated to the 
wider public. 
What counts as effective? How will the 
impacts of plans be shared? What part of the 
plans will be dedicated to showing 
effectiveness?  
Objectivity How knowledge claims seek to appear 
objective. Jasanoff construes this as a 
fairness issue in that it seeks to avoid 
subjective bias. 
What knowledge claims will be needed in the 
plans? Do they need to be objective, or are 
perceptions valued? How is fairness 
understood? 
Expertise Expertise is largely ascribed through 
unwritten cultural rules. Considers how 
experts are identified, and whether their 
status as experts is held personally or 
institutionally.  
Do plans need expert guidance? Is this stated 
formally or implied informally? Who can 
submit a plan in practice? Who must be 
consulted for their expertise during the plan 
development? 
Transparency Institutional mechanisms for permitting 
public observation and in turn, 
participation in decision making 
processes. 
Who is required to participate in plan 
development? Why? Who must be aware of 
the plans before and after they are 
submitted/gazetted? Who CAN participate, 
not just required to?  
Knowledge Systems 
Credibility The kinds of knowledge (and who it 
belongs to) that tend to be most readily 
accepted by decision-makers. Considers 
the role of participation in supporting 
credibility, and what kinds of 
knowledge have a role in formal 
accountability processes. Questions 
whether there are different forms of 
expertise, and how and why these come 
together or are kept apart. Examines 
who holds authority based on their 
knowledge. 
What knowledge must be included for a plan 
to be approved? What information is needed 
for it to be considered a credible document? 
What knowledge is not accepted in plans? 
Salience  The visibility of the knowledge-based 
needs of decision-makers to knowledge-
makers. Considers what processes 
enable this visibility and whose interests 
are included or excluded.  
What knowledge do community members 
need to be able to write plans? Do they have a 
means of getting that information from 
whomever can provide it? Do government 
professionals responsible for approving plans 
have a means of determining what knowledge 
they need to be able to approve plans? 
Legitimacy Examines whose concept of public good 
or desired outcome dominates and why. 
Looks specifically at whether required 
decision processes (science-based or 
otherwise) reinforce or challenge 
existing power relations. Considers 
societal expectations of objectivity and 
their effect on the role of science or 
What is the desired outcome of local plans; 
does this differ between the local and national 
level? What knowledge will approval and 
revision of plans be based on, and how does 
this relate to how decisions are typically 
made? When there is a conflict between 
knowledge types, which type “wins” or is 
trusted more? 
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LEK in decision making, and what type 
of knowledge might have a mediating 
role between conflicting societal views. 
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4 RESULTS & DISCUSSION 
 
4.1 Elements of Adaptive Governance 
Research on adaptive modes of governing resources indicates that while the specifics of 
what makes governance adaptive in different contexts may vary, there are some shared 
characteristics across systems (Huitema et al. 2009, Chaffin et al. 2014). The Frameworks for 
Analysis section draws on past summaries of these characteristics as a sort of “ideal type” for 
governance. While no one system is expected to reflect all of these characteristics fully, a system 
that seems to be moving towards these traits may be improving its ability to be adaptive. The 
results presented in this section compare the current arrangements of inshore fisheries 
governance to this set of characteristics, with a particular focus on the changes brought about by 
Section 18 of the FMA (2015). A few interviewees with a background in governance and policy 
research explicitly mentioned the relation of adaptive governance principles to the development 
of the Act, suggesting that some actors may directly connect these concepts to policy work in 
practice. However, the majority of these themes were not directly discussed by participants, with 
the data presented here being derived from interview questions designed to address these 
elements. 
 
4.1.1 Bioregional Fit 
Bioregional fit refers to the degree to which institutions or political jurisdictions are 
matched to the ecologically functional scale relevant to the problems they seek to address 
(Huitema et al. 2009). This can be achieved through aligning political jurisdictions to relevant 
bioregions, combining jurisdictions to reach appropriate biophysical scales, or creating 
partnerships across existing jurisdictions to reach the relevant scale of social-ecological problems 
(Huitema et al. 2009). The discussion of fit begins with the general institutional structure of the 
Solomon Islands Government, followed by a more specific focus on fisheries governance.  
The Solomon Islands are divided into nine provinces, with inshore fisheries managed at 
both the national level and provincial level, and with primary responsibilities given to the 
provinces for their own provincial waters (see Sec. 4.1.3: Polycentricity). There are no formal 
government institutions responsible for fisheries at smaller scales; local and regional tribal 
councils exist at lower levels but are not responsible for fisheries management. However, the 
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Provincial Government Act (1997) and Constitution explicitly recognizes traditional rights 
through existing customary systems at the local level (Pulea 1993).  
Following the lead of the Constitution and other acts, the FMA (2015) also recognizes 
customary rights (s. 21), and through Section 18 provides an avenue for making specific 
customary rules around fisheries enforceable. On its face, this has some potential to improve the 
biogeographic fit of fisheries governance institutions. The FMA (2015) establishes that 
communities can submit management plans for their own tenure areas, and that if approved these 
plans are gazetted at the provincial level. Once entered in the Gazette, the plans have the legal 
status of regulations made under the FMA (2015). While the term “community” is not explicitly 
defined in the Act, it does state that plans can be written “by or on behalf of customary rights 
holders” (s. 18 (1)). This essentially transitions informal arrangements for enforcing customary 
rules into a more formal arrangements that allow for police and courts to intervene as they would 
for violations against any other regulation under the Act.  
It might be said that bioregional fit is slightly improved by this provision for community 
plans, as these bylaws allow for formal enforcement at a finer scale. However, customary areas 
in the Solomon Islands are determined by social factors rather than ecological factors; therefore a 
registered tribal area rarely if ever “fits” the relevant ecological scale. To give a hypothetical 
example, a tribe could own a reef and create bylaws that apply to fishing that reef, but they might 
not be able to protect a nearby spawning area or mangrove nursery that is critical for the 
population of fish on that reef. Furthermore, although the FMA (2015) enables communities to 
submit plans, it does not require it nor is it expected that many communities will actually do this. 
It is more likely that only communities with strong governance and the assistance of NGOs or 
the government will be able to effectively navigate the approval process. Therefore the areas 
where finer scale management occur will be scattered and unlikely to add up to any significant 
improvement in bioregional fit.  
Given this assessment, overall the FMA (2015) keeps the bioregional fit of inshore 
fisheries institutions at more or less the same level as previous to the Act. An exception to this 
could occur in the unlikely event that plans for areas where tenure boundaries happen to line up 
with relevant ecological scales, or, even more unlikely, when adjacent tenure areas are registered 
such that together they improve fit to relevant scales. One government professional noted that a 
“nice vision is…lagoon-wide management plans” (Interview 8), but emphasized that this was 
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unlikely to happen any time soon because it is difficult to get adjacent tribes to agree with one 
another on rules, as discussed more extensively in the next section. Therefore it seems unlikely 
that the FMA (2015) improves bioregional fit in any significant way. 
 
4.1.2 Boundaries 
De Caro et al. (2017) suggest well-defined boundaries as a potential design principle for 
adaptive governance on the premise that this will provide clarity around legal and institutional 
jurisdictions. The topic of boundaries came up in three quarters of the interviews, usually in the 
context of discussing challenges for communities developing plans; customary boundaries are 
often nebulous and flexible, and writing them down as precise lines can cause disputes over 
ownership. This has interesting implications for how the development of plans, which require 
boundaries to be written down (FMA 2015 Second Schedule), may affect the adaptiveness of this 
system.  
On the one hand, participants suggested that this will improve enforceability and the 
ability of the nation to report progress towards international agreements. One NGO professional 
reflected: 
The benefit of writing the boundaries into the plan is basically that report up ability. 
Like to be able to say this percentage of land is in protection…I know the ministry in 
terms of their obligations that they sign up to, they report to, you know how many 
percentage of the country is managed, that sort of thing…wanting to know what area 
of Solomon islands is under local management. But I think it’s also in, even for the 
Coral Triangle program in country, that’s one thing that they report against, the 
country report against as well. (Interview 13) 
Writing down the boundaries therefore provides a way to track progress towards these goals. On 
the other hand, NGO and some government professionals were quick to point out the difficulties 
of writing down previously verbal boundaries, which resonates with literature on the difficulties 
of formalizing customary systems (Pulea 1993). One NGO professional notes that writing 
boundaries into plans is “easier for communities who have clear tenure ownership…But for areas 
that don’t have clear tenure ownership, then that is a sort of a potential source of issues” 
(Interview 13). Another NGO participant echoed this concern: 
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You need to document that your neighbors, so the people that own the land 
adjacent to the protected area, uh, approve of it and are happy with it, and agree 
with the boundaries that you’ve set. So that’s, that boundary agreement has been a 
bit of a sticking point in some of the applications we’ve been developing, because 
typically these, these tribes or communities are sort of at war with each other, 
because of, fundamentally, because of logging disagreements. (Interview 3) 
At worst, land disputes may become so intense that NGOs or government professionals trying to 
assist communities will be forced to step back until the conflict is resolved. This could mean 
their plans never come to be at all; some NGO and government participants indicate a 
willingness to come back after a conflict is resolved, while others seemed to hint otherwise. 
 
Normally for sorting out the landownership, we put it back to them, there is a 
dispute, we just, we don’t involve in dispute. We just sit back and, ask them to 
sort it out between them, then we can go back and help them. (NGO professional; 
Interview 12) 
 
“If there’s a conflict going on in the community or with another community, you 
have to stand back and say look we can’t work.” (NGO professional; Interview 1) 
 
This suggests that writing down boundaries may provide clarity but will likely slow the process 
of developing plans. This could in turn delay approval and enforcement that may be desperately 
needed; some participants expressed concern that communities wishing to submit plans may be 
driven by imminent threats, such as the start of a logging operation that could pollute a reef: 
Unfortunately a logging operation descended upon the community…about less 
than a kilometer away from their mpa. So they are digging up the corals and 
[community leader] wants to take them to court and all that…he’s sort of, pushing 
ahead with trying to register their management plan. (NGO professional; Interview 
13) 
On the surface then, following De Caro’s (2017) suggested criteria, the FMA 
(2015) improves the clarity of boundaries and therefore should improve the adaptiveness 
of the system. However, considering the benefits of flexible verbal customary systems 
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(Hviding 1998, Aswani et al. 2007), and the challenges that writing down boundaries has 
caused for CBRM efforts in the past, perhaps this ‘candidate design principle’ should be 
questioned when applied in this context. Given the interview responses above, it is 
reasonable to question whether the process of writing down boundaries has more 
drawbacks for adaptability than the benefit of the outcome of having clear boundaries. 
Taking this a little further, it is also worth noting that a document that must be upheld in 
court and enforced by police is inherently going to need this level of clarity. This opens 
the conversation to a broader question of whether legal enforcement is the best option in 
places where boundaries are often a sensitive topic—perhaps other methods should be 
included first. One government professional imparted this sentiment, stating, “this is one 
tool…It’s one option, it’s one avenue for communities…you don’t need this to do 
CBRM. [Communities] can just do it on their own” (Interview 8). 
 
4.1.3 Nested Polycentricity 
Huitema (et al. 2009) defines a system as polycentric when it has multiple centers of 
power. This means that political authority is dispersed to entities with overlapping and nested 
jurisdictions that are not arranged in a hierarchy, or are at least not only arranged in a hierarchy 
(Folke et al. 2005, Huitema et al. 2009 citing Skelcher (2005)). This recommendation for AG 
comes from recognition of the failure of centralized, technocratic systems of governing to 
provide flexible, contextually-appropriate, and adequately responsive means of managing 
resources (Huitema et al. 2009). This is recognized to some degree in the Pacific; Aswani and 
Sabetian (2009) point out “that centralized and science-driven coastal fisheries programs in the 
region have, in general, failed,” adding that this has led to an interest in the role of customary 
governance systems in marine management. A polycentric arrangement of decision making 
authority is considered better able to cope with change and uncertainty than monocentric 
arrangements for the following reasons: a) issues can be addressed at the scale relevant to the 
scope of the problem, b) high overlap and redundancy in decision making bodies reduces 
vulnerability by allowing one unit to take over the functions any units that fail, and c) the large 
number of decision making units facilitates experimentation, in turn allowing units to learn from 
one another (Huitema et al. 2009). This does however come with tradeoffs, as polycentricity will 
cause a need for collective decision making made difficult by the complex and overlapping 
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decision making system; this will require careful coordination which can be costly and can risk a 
loss of democratic accountability when responsibilities are especially dispersed (Huitema et al. 
2009). Folke et al. (2005) suggests that the aim of polycentric governance is to strike “a balance 
between decentralized and centralized control,” which suggests the need to evaluate tradeoffs 
between the degree of redundancy between institutions and the cost of coordinating such a 
system to find the balance appropriate for a given context. Polycentricity is frequently suggested 
as an essential context necessary for the emergence of adaptive governance (Dietz et al. 2003, 
Folke et al. 2005, Huitema et al. 2009, Chaffin et al. 2014). However, there is no generally 
agreed upon scale or scope or substance for measuring polycentricity, which limits this analysis 
to empirical observations without a scale to compare directly to other contexts (Huitema et al. 
2009). Here I will make observations about the degree to which elements of inshore fisheries 
governance currently reflect elements of polycentricity relative only to the status of inshore 
fisheries previous to the passage of the new fisheries act.  
The FMA (1998) established that provinces are responsible for the management of reef, 
inshore, and freshwater fisheries. The FMA (2015) reiterates this, stating that “each Provincial 
Government shall have primary responsibility for the conservation, management, development 
and sustainable use of fisheries resources within its provincial waters” (Part 3 Section 14 (1)). 
The FMA (2015) does not change the jurisdictions of formal government institutions, but does 
uphold that the primary responsibility for inshore fisheries is placed on the shoulders of 
provincial governments. According to interview participants, the provinces will be responsible 
for part of the plan approval process for the Act, and may be the level at which accepted plans 
are gazetted. The process for approval once a plan is submitted to the government is still being 
finalized, and participants held conflicting views on where final approval would be made; this is 
process will be finalized this year. After plans are approved, the process for day-to-day 
management and enforcement would be led by the local committee, which would consist of 
customary rights holders. The tentative approval process as described by government 
professionals working on standard operating procedures (SOPs) is as follows (Figure 2): 
1. Local committees consisting of customary rights holders must work with the relevant 
Provincial Executive to approve plans before they can be approved at the provincial level 
(FMA (2015) Part 4 s.18(3)) 
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2. Plans will be submitted to provincial fisheries offices and will need to align with both 
the provincial level ordinances, bylaws, and existing government plans, and with the 
FMA (2015) (Part 4 s.18(5)); all provinces will need to create or revise existing 
provincial fisheries ordinances to ensure alignment with the FMA (2015). Plans will also 
be submitted to the Director at the national level to receive final approval; it is unclear 
whether submission to the provincial and national level will be simultaneous or 
sequential with the provincial approval coming first (this is where interview responses 
conflicted). This will be worked out in the SOPs, with government professionals 
indicating that it would be sequential (province then national) even though it appears to 
be simultaneous in the text of Act, which reads: “[plans] shall be submitted to both the 
Provincial Executive and Director at the same time, for their respective review and 
approval” (FMA (2015) Part 4 s.18(5)). 
3. If approved by the Director at the national level, plans will be sent back to the 
provinces to be gazetted at the provincial level. 
 
 
Figure 2. Potential plan approval process as described in Fall 2017.  
This is the first time that local level plans created and governed by customary rights 
holders will be incorporated into national policy, according to my review of the two previous 
fisheries acts, and comments from interview participants. It represents a transition from the 
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previous fisheries management act, which delegated primary formal responsibility for inshore 
fisheries to the provinces, but not to local level leaders. Now, customary rights holders will have 
explicit rules enforced by national government if their plans are approved. Any plans with rules 
pertaining to customary tenure areas and any revisions to such plan require the review and 
written consent of customary rights holders (FMA (2015) Second Schedule (13-14)). This new 
Act aligns with the SI constitution, which explicitly recognizes the rights of customary tenure 
holders, and provides a means for realizing this recognition. This was a point of confusion 
amongst study participants, as it is unclear whether or not police or courts could be called upon 
to enforce local rights on a constitutional basis alone. It appears that the FMA (2015) does not 
change the legal recognition of customary rights in any way, and indeed reinforces it (s.21). 
What it does do is provide an avenue for government enforcement of specific fisheries rules.8 
Previously, the government would uphold customary claims to tenure areas but seems to have 
needed the FMA (2015) to enable legal enforcement of specific rules. Based on the interview 
responses of NGO and government professionals, the assumption seems to have been that 
customary leaders are enabled to enforce their own rules, but the strength of these customary 
systems has broken down in some areas, leaving communities to seek help with enforcement 
from the government.  
Although the interaction between the FMA (2015) and constitutional support for CMT 
remains a bit blurry, the new Act is widely seen by interview participants as a first opportunity to 
formalize rules prescribed by customary owners in a legal format. The shift from informal to 
formal can in this context be seen as a change in Folke et al.’s (2005) “balance” between 
centralized and decentralized control, with a shift towards the latter, but this claim must be made 
carefully in the context of customary systems and is dependent on perspective. The idea of 
“control” is not defined by Folke et al. (2005), so in discussing the shift here I will focus on 
control as “ability to enforce” rather than the right to make rules, though the term seems to imply 
both.  
                                               
8 The action of formalizing unwritten customary systems into written and often rigid forms is 
controversial and has been the subject of much debate in the Pacific (Pulea 1993, Hviding 1998). This 
literature could perhaps be drawn on to inform future modifications to adaptive governance prescriptions 
when considering ways to improve their relevance in the Pacific, and in other places where land tenure 
and resource use is not based on private property rights. 
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The preexistence of customary systems backed by constitutional law in SI means that 
control over user behavior does not, supposedly, shift to the government, even though the Act 
was often perceived that way at the local level. The Act instead appears to intend that customary 
leaders maintain their control but are enabled to draw on government enforcement to do so. 
However, the Act does state that a plan “may provide for a commitment by the relevant 
community, customary owners of fisheries resources and fishing rights and other 
stakeholders…to manage the fisheries…in the designated area only in accordance with the Plan” 
(FMA (2015) Second Schedule (10), emphasis added). This suggests that local leaders could 
potentially trap themselves in their own rules; an approved plan is legally binding, which may 
risk reducing leaders’ control by limiting their ability to change their own rules. This concern 
was directly voiced by a local fisher, “[Plan is] very good for our future, but sometime we will 
go and trap ourselves…because for me, stop our [marine protected] place, area for go. But we 
forgot it and go fishing, we spoil our reefs.” In other words, the plan is perceived as useful but is 
also concerning because the consequences for violating rules could be severe. Anecdotally, one 
participant at the local level recalled a story about a customary leader in the Arnavons being 
caught by rangers for a rule he himself had written and signed as part of a management plan 
created in collaboration with NGOs. This occurred before the Arnavons were officially 
registered through the Protected Areas Act (2010), using a process very similar to the FMA 
(2015), so the consequences for that individual were likely less severe than they would be now. 
This particular story is unverified but suggests that at the very least this is something on the 
minds of people at the local level, and that the effect of a gazetted plan on leaders’ control over 
resources should be clarified. More generally, this concern points to the inherent tradeoffs 
between different elements of AG (e.g. improved enforcement through bylaws vs flexibility to 
easily change rules), and the need to identify context-appropriate ways to balance these tradeoffs.  
The Act itself states that “the Director, in consultation with the relevant communities, 
may amend a [plan] by notice in the Gazette” (FMA (2015) Part 4 Section 18 (8)). Concern over 
how plans will be modified was occasionally raised by interview participants, and it was not 
clear if and how community leaders could initiate this. According to interviews with government 
professionals, the details of how plans will be amended will be incorporated into regulations or 
SOPs: “…(changing gazetted plans) is also a concern for us…it didn’t really specify in the act 
that a management plan should be for five years, or six years, but we are hoping that will be 
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captured in the regulations.” Given that there seems to be concern around this issue at the 
national level, it seems likely that SOPs that address concerns over revisions will be worked out, 
but this remains to be seen.   
In conclusion, on its face this Act seems to increase the polycentricity of inshore fisheries 
governance by requiring the formation of committees and formalizing their role through by-laws, 
thereby devolving at least a small amount of power, in the formal government sense, to the local 
level. That said, in practice the Act only slightly modifies a system that has until now been 
operating informally, meaning operating within customary systems but not explicitly described 
through policies in the more Western-style government. From the perspective of the local level, 
it could be argued that this Act actually appears to shift towards more (police and courts) 
centralized governance because it outsources the most severe enforcement from the local level to 
national authorities, and requires approval of plans and any revisions by the Director; local 
committees are responsible for day-to-day enforcement but can bring in outside authorities if 
needed (see Sec. 4.1.4: Enforcement). Regardless of perspective, there is a shift here toward 
government polycentricity even if this doesn’t change the polycentricity of governance in 
practice except for the requirement of a special fisheries committee separate from the general 
committees that often run local villages. It does this by requiring approval at the local, 
provincial, and national level; creating some redundancy in the system. Until the lack of clarity 
around whether submission to the national or provincial level will occur simultaneously is 
resolved, it is difficult to draw definite conclusions. The Act seems to imply that submission to 
both levels is simultaneous, but interview responses from government professionals indicated it 
would travel sequentially, first to the provincial level then to national, and then back again to be 
gazetted at the provincial level. If simultaneous, this implies increased redundancy, but not 
necessarily less hierarchy in the system. That said, the requirement for Director approval still 
implies a degree of centrality, with participants from government additionally indicating that 
MFMR intends to play a growing “coordinating” role for CBRM in SI (both through the Act and 
in general). This underlines the idea that the government is attempting to become more 
polycentric through shifting towards the local scale through the plans and playing a coordinating 
role. 
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4.1.4 Enforcement & Conflict Resolution 
The need for effective enforcement at the local level is widely recognized in CBRM and 
adaptive governance scholarship. De Caro et al. (2017) draw on this in proposing an institutional 
design principle for enforcement: “in addition to external monitoring and enforcement systems, 
organizations and collectives…have internal mechanisms to monitor and enforce compliance.” 
This emphasis on both external and internal enforcement is particularly relevant to the FMA 
(2015), which introduces external enforcement mechanisms (e.g. police) for communities while 
still keeping primary enforcement responsibilities internal to communities through their local 
committees. The FMA (2015) states that “enforcement powers and authorities” must be included 
in management plans but provides no further guidance or restrictions on who those authorities 
must be at the local level (Part 4 s.17 (7) (ii)). It seemed to be assumed by interviewees that the 
enforcement would be by members of the local communities, paid or unpaid. Some participants 
referred to “rangers” as the likely enforcement authorities; these are local residents trained by 
government or NGOs on monitoring and enforcement.  
The addition of outside enforcement options suggests a significant change in how marine 
resources, and especially inshore fisheries, are governed at the local level. Up until this point 
management has been done through “informal” customary means9. Dietz et al. (2003) write that 
regardless of whether enforcement mechanisms are formal or informal, “those who impose them 
must be seen as effective and legitimate by resource users or resistance and evasion will 
overwhelm the commons governance strategy.” In some areas of the Solomon Islands, including 
the village I visited, there seems to be a sort of “legitimacy crisis” regarding enforcement. Local 
level interviews suggested a generational shift in perception of which source of enforcement is 
considered “effective and legitimate.” Many interviewees suggested that the need for registration 
under the FMA (2015) is driven by the desire to regulate the behavior of a younger generation, 
and a belief that this generation will respect formal bylaws more readily than “traditional” local 
leaders. One village participant indicated that past mechanisms of enforcement, such as whipping 
offenders, were no longer in use; another interview at the national level confirmed that public 
whipping was used in the past in some communities. While disputes, especially domestic 
                                               
9 Assigning customary systems the title of “informal” is meant to indicate that these systems are different from 
common law and not written down in the “formal” way of the Western world; whether something is seen as 
“formal” or “informal” does however seem to be a bit a matter of perspective. The tribes may very well see their 
systems as formal too.  
  47 
disputes, were occasionally settled violently, there were not any public forms of corporal 
punishment, and even domestic violence was somewhat frowned upon, seemingly due to the 
strong influence of the church on communities. It seems that while public methods of 
punishment like this have become outdated, there is nothing in place to replace it, and that this is 
what makes the Act appealing to local leaders. One leader in the community reflected, “…hard 
time today, our new generation…maybe the law can guide them.” This sentiment arose 
consistently across local level interviews, but these interviews were primarily conducted with 
residents over the age of 30.  
Further interviews should be conducted with more individuals in the 18 to 30 age range 
to assess whether or not this generation is indeed the source of most fishing violations, what their 
ideas are on fisheries management, and if they do indeed respect the law more than customary 
systems (perhaps they respect neither, or both). There were two participants who fell into this 
age range, and while one was not as familiar with the FMA (2015) as I expected, the other was 
actually quite supportive of the need for active management and the potential utility of plan 
submission under the Act to achieve this. This young generation of fishers was difficult to reach 
during the relatively short time period of my study, for two reasons. First, my sampling focus 
was initially on those who had attended the government workshop on the Act because I was 
interested on getting local perspectives on the provision for plans. As it happened, few members 
of the young generation had attended this workshop, which may indicate that the older 
generations’ perceptions are warranted, and also made it more difficult to identify participants. 
Second, this generation was particularly hard to connect with as an outsider with light skin, and 
this was confounded by cultural norms around cross-gender interactions; many of the prominent 
fishers were men, and it is not typical for men and women to speak one-on-one with the privacy 
that interviews require. For this reason, government and NGO projects often go out of their way 
to ensure that both men and women are involved in outreach efforts to communities10.  
Although many participants at the local level suggested that legal enforcement may be 
needed for the younger generation, several participants also voiced reservations about switching 
to this method. While whipping is no longer used in the village, the importance of interpersonal 
relationships, a well-known characteristic of CMT systems (Hviding and Baines 1994), was 
prominent in discussions about marine management, and residents seemed concerned about the 
                                               
10 Information from national level interviews.  
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ramifications of formalizing customary rules for relationships. In many ways respect for village 
rules was tied up in individuals’ concern over their image within the community. There were a 
few instances where residents knew that I had witnessed them breaking rules associated with the 
church, and they would beg me not to “spoil their name” by reporting their actions. Though there 
was substantially more social pressure associated with church rules than with fishing rules, it is 
clear that the incentive to follow rules of any sort comes from a desire to preserve personal 
reputation. This entered the discussion of writing management plans when participants voiced 
concern over how calling the police on fishers from both within and outside of the community. 
In the village I visited, one of the village leaders voiced concern over how other communities 
would respond if the police were called on one of their residents for fishing without permission. 
This was a subtle concern that emerged in the following conversation: 
Participant: We need to register our community and we register our area. If 
someone come and breach our rules, we will take that guy to the court…but if we 
community, we can settle the problem. Easy to settle the problem. Talk about it… 
Interviewer: With the person coming in? 
Participant: Yah, talk to the guy, oh you don’t do it again, yah? But if we do 
register… 
Interviewer: If you register it, then what happens? 
Participant: Then we, let’s say we open it, get the guy, we will end up go to the 
court. So, for me, it’s okay. Our relationship here, with the villages, will not 
really… 
Interviewer: Not as good? 
Participant: Yah, that’s what I think. 
Interviewer: So…if you go to the courts, it’s not as good for the relationship, but 
if you keep it here locally…? 
Participant: We can settle it, easy to settle it.  
The leader here is essentially describing informal interactions of reprimanding through 
conversation, and despite earlier voicing concerns about enforcement, did not seem to 
concerned about that here. It may be that enforcing against external violators is more 
easily achieved than enforcement against violators internal to the community. However, 
some participants seemed hesitant to use police internally either. The problem of concern 
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would be the personal ramifications of calling out either a relative or a resident from 
another family. Given that the community is very small, it is easy to see why this would 
be a concern; in an environment where community members are interdependent, calling 
the police on someone would likely damage social bonds that are relied upon in other 
aspects of life. The details of such concerns would be better addressed through more in-
depth, longitudinal sociological or anthropological research, but the takeaway here is that 
formal enforcement might not be welcomed. 
The discussion up until this point has focused on what the shift in enforcement looks like 
in terms of the text of the Act and its interpretation by interviewees, but enforcement “on paper” 
can be very different than enforcement in practice. The ability of the government to enforce the 
rules within local plans was one of the biggest concerns brought up by participants when asked 
about challenges for implementing the act. Questions were raised about where the capacity for 
enforcement would come from at the national level, though at the local level this concern was 
not mentioned at all. One NGO participant stated rather wryly, “It’s not so much the [plan] I 
think it’s gonna be fine, it’s just the enforcement part of it all is going to be the challenge,” then 
added “not just here in the Solomons but in the Pacific in general…you’ll see a lot of fisheries 
acts and so forth, but the enforcement is always the weak part.” The limiting factor for 
government seems to be lack of personnel capacity, and the cost of fuel, which is quite expensive 
in rural parts of the Solomon Islands (it was ~SBD$13/liter, or ~US$6.50/gallon in Marovo 
Lagoon while I was there). On the other end, the potential cost to communities of trying to bring 
someone to court may also be prohibitive. One NGO professional explained this:  
I would prosecute in the customary way, like he or she will pay compensation to 
whatever community. But going up to the national level, how would that happen? 
It may take time, it may cost money which the community could not afford. 
The cost to the government for police enforcement and the cost to communities for taking 
violators to court could be quite high. This may in part be mitigated by the requirement that plans 
assign primary enforcement responsibilities within the community, but given that one of the 
main points of registration is to give access to the police, this appears to be a relatively serious 
concern for the implementation of the Act.  
The lack of faith in government enforcement that was so prominent at the national level 
was comparatively lacking at the local level, even though the nearest police station is a two-hour 
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boat ride from the village. Frustrations with the government that surfaced during interviews 
seemed to be more about failure to provide promised development assistance or failure to offer 
development assistance in the first place. Two participants from the same family relayed the 
story of clearing land and planting an oil palm plantation after the government promised to assist 
with building oil processing plants in the lagoon. The family invested their time and money into 
the plantation, only to find that the government did not hold up their end of the bargain, causing 
the fruit to go to waste. Despite this history, when asked what the role of government ought to be 
in fisheries at the local level, many participants (including those involved in the oil palm 
plantation) responded that the government should provide materials, training, and capital to 
improve fishing and help with the enforcement of rules. Many requested a “rafter,” referring to a 
fish aggregating device (FAD), which is a wooden float placed in nearshore waters so that fish 
will gather underneath it, which makes catching them easier. One participant did go so far as to 
accuse the government of misusing money, saying that aid money given to the government for 
developing local sanitation projects actually went into the pockets of government officials. 
Despite this, the government was still expected to deliver resources and there were no doubts 
raised about the ability of police to actually enforce rules. One participant told a story about a 
man in the village who had recently been released from jail after committing a crime unrelated to 
fisheries. It may be that this recent event has proved the presence of police to the community and 
that this may be why their enforcement abilities are not questioned. 
Overall, the Act has potential to improve enforcement in a way that aligns with De Caro 
et al.’s (2017) recommendation for both internal and external mechanisms. However, this may be 
complicated by social dynamics of transition from customary to police enforcement, and by the 
likely limited capacity of police to respond to requests. If the government is able to meet 
demands for enforcement, then the Act does transition towards the recommendation for internal 
and external mechanisms. The relationship-related concerns over adding external enforcement 
may, however, be something to revisit when considering what adaptive governance looks like in 
places with active CMT systems in the Pacific. 
 
4.1.5 Inclusive Participation 
There is a broad call in adaptive governance research for inclusive, meaningful 
participation in decision making by those affected by decisions (Folke et al. 2005, Huitema et al. 
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2009, Chaffin et al. 2014, De Caro et al. 2017). Meaningful participation involves both broad 
participation from a variety of stakeholders, and broad capacity for these stakeholders to 
contribute within the process they have been invited into (Folke et al. 2005, De Caro etal. 2017). 
This is typically achieved through co-management or collaborative relationships between 
government and non-governmental entities including local communities (Huitema et al. 2009, De 
Caro et al. 2017). The co-management of marine resources is the primary method of formal 
(non-CMT) inshore fisheries and marine management in the Solomon Islands11. This is achieved 
primarily through partnerships between communities and environmental NGOs, although the 
CBRM unit within MFMR is also beginning to partner with communities12 (Cohen et al. 2012). 
Additionally, a CBRM approach is formally encouraged as the means for meeting regional goals 
under the Coral Triangle Initiative through the Solomon Islands National Plan of Action; the 
prioritization of this approach is also seen in the recent creation of the CBRM unit within 
MFMR. It is from this context that the provision for plan submission under the FMA (2015) has 
emerged, and this has both positive and negative implications for how inclusive fisheries 
governance is likely to be under the Act. 
The importance of engaging regularly with communities and including all stakeholders 
(young, old, women, men, etc.) in CBRM projects was a running theme across interviews with 
NGO participants. These NGOs were consulted at various points during the development of the 
Act, but participants did not explicitly state, or often times do not seem to remember, exactly 
which provisions they recommended for the Act. This is not too surprising as it has been a few 
years since the consultations for the Act were held—most were done in 2014. However, the text 
of the FMA (2015) appears to reflect the NGO practice of valuing and frequently engaging with 
communities. Consultation with customary rights holders is frequently mentioned in the text of 
the FMA (2015). It is explicitly stated that fisheries management plans must be approved by “a 
management committee representing the customary rights holders” regardless of whether the 
plan is initiated by the fisheries Director or submitted by a community (FMA (2015) Part 4, 
s.17(2)(c)). The requirement for community level committees of rights holders is a clear attempt 
at including those affected by decisions in decision making processes. However, it should also be 
noted that because the Constitution supports customary rights and because resources are 
                                               
11 Information from national level interviews.  
12 Information from national level interviews. 
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customarily owned, the government actually cannot make any decisions about these resources 
without the rights holders’ consent; this is what likely drives the provision. Still, it is noteworthy 
that the customary context makes this participation aspect of adaptive governance essentially 
mandatory, and that the Act takes a clear stance on reinforcing deference to these CMT 
arrangements. 
In addition to requiring local committees representative of rights holders, the Act 
articulates that plans must include the “written consent of the relevant customary rights holders” 
(Second Schedule (13)). This is interesting because it potentially means going beyond those who 
“own” the space to those who have a right to use it. It is unclear how the Act will draw the line 
here because rights are based on complex kinship relationships, and vary in strength based on 
strength of relational connections (Hviding and Baines 1994). For example, a grandchild would 
have stronger rights to use their grandparents’ area than a cousin, though which grandparent’s 
area they can access might depend on whether they are in a matrilineal or patrilineal tribe (the 
Southern part of Marovo Lagoon seemed to be matrilineal and patriarchal). NGO participants 
indicated that while in some cases they will document the primary owners of a tenure area, they 
do not typically try to document all of the rights-holders given the complexity of this system. 
Therefore, this provision seems to have some potential to ensure participation by those affected 
by decisions, but it is unclear how this inclusion will be achieved in practice. 
While it appears that inclusive participation will be encouraged within each community 
that submits a plan, there are likely to be inequalities between communities that are or are not 
able to submit plans across the nation as a whole. All four environmental NGOs mentioned that 
they need to be selective about which communities they choose to work with; because 
communities who submit plans under the Act will likely need the help of NGOs and the 
government, this has serious implications for which communities will be able to do so. One of 
the most frequently mentioned criteria for choosing to work with a community was that the 
community needed to have strong, intact customary governance. The reason for this is tied to the 
desire of NGOs to be inclusive when working with communities. NGOs are often approached by 
individuals within communities who request assistance, often with preventing exploitation of 
their resources by foreign industry, but who do not necessarily represent the entire community. 
At times this can be because they seek individual gain from the funding and resources provided 
by NGOs, and at other times it can be because they genuinely want to improve the well-being of 
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their entire community. The former case causes obvious issues with the work of NGOs being 
accepted and welcome by a community; the latter can be an issue if the individual approaching 
an NGO comes from a fractured community where it will be difficult for NGOs to be welcomed 
in. This can happen, for example, with logging, where part of the community may seek the 
immediate economic benefits of logging royalties while other parts of the community fear the 
long term consequences of logging activities for their fishery and approach NGOs for help.  
The need for NGOs to be prudent with funding and community engagement, and the fact 
that NGOs make up the majority of on-the-ground capacity to help communities, means that the 
Act seems more likely to help communities with strong governance than those with weak 
governance. The purpose of the Act is to strengthen customary systems where enforcement is 
needed, but it seems likely that it will end up selecting for communities that already have 
cohesive governance. This may imply that the Act will not be very able to help communities 
with weak governance seeking to improve enforcement of their rules against local fishers. The 
Act may therefore end up being used for communities seeking to exclude foreign industry, such 
as companies seeking to extract timber or baitfish. Several participants mentioned that this is the 
way they intend to use Section 18, and one government participant pointed out that a vocal local 
leader was intending to use the provision to stop logging companies from destroying his 
communities reef (Interview #13). However, this does not necessarily line up well with what 
Section 18 of the Act is meant to do, as a separate provision exists elsewhere in the Act to protect 
against unwanted foreign industry activities. This recognition of customary rights and the 
prohibition of commercial-scale infringements on these rights is made clear in section 21:  
Customary rights shall be fully recognized and respected in all activities falling 
within the scope of this Act. No person shall, without permission given by the 
relevant customary rights holders, use a vessel other than a vessel used for 
customary fishing, to—engage in fishing, otherwise enter, or directly or indirectly 
cause destruction to an area subject to customary rights. (Part 4, s.21 (1-3)) 
It therefore does not seem that the plans described in Section 18 are intended for dealing 
with excluding foreign industry, despite NGOs and at least one local leader seeming to  
see it this way. Section 18 seems instead to be designed for enforcing rules set up for 
local fishers both within and outside of a community. The specific criteria around 
describing a fishery, management goals, and penalties, along with the comments of 
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government participants, indicate this focus on enforcing day-to-day local management. 
If this is the case, and the Act is indeed aimed at strengthening local rules in communities 
with weak customary governance, it is problematic that the politics of NGO and 
government engagement with communities may cause communities with strong 
governance to benefit most from the Act, unintentionally excluding the communities that 
may most need assistance.  
The FMA (2015) seems to improve or at least uphold the previously existing 
value for inclusive participation in local level fisheries governance in the Solomon 
Islands. The specific requirements for consultation with and consent from rights-holders 
may even improve the inclusiveness of governance, if it is well-implemented in practice. 
At a broader scale, the Act is likely to be less inclusive, in that not all communities that 
may need the help with enforcement provided by the Act are likely to be able to get 
through the process of registering their plans. However, given that there was previously 
no mechanism for any community rules to be included in national legislation, other than 
the general recognition of customary rights, the Act overall pushes the needle towards 
more inclusive participation.  
 
4.1.6 Leadership 
Folke et al. (2005) emphasize that collaboration in the governance of natural resources 
requires leadership, which is considered essential for “shaping change and reorganization by 
providing innovation in order to achieve the flexibility needed to deal with ecosystem dynamics” 
(Folke et al. 2005). This is thought to be especially true for co-management of fisheries 
(Gutierrez et al. 2011, Wamukota et al. 2012). A review of 130 co-managed fisheries in countries 
of varying ecosystems, degrees of development, fishing sectors, and resource type found that 
leadership as the most important attribute for successful fisheries management (Gutierrez et al. 
2011). The story of the FMA (2015), and inshore fisheries more generally in the Solomon 
Islands, aligns with this literature—key leaders at the national level were important for the Act, 
while key leaders at the local level were important more generally. 
Interviews with government and NGO professionals involved in, or familiar with, the 
process of developing the FMA (2015) pointed out that in such a small country, having a few key 
people to push legislation through makes a big difference. This leadership theme came up 
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frequently in interviews even though I did not ask any direct questions about it. The drafting of 
the Act took over a decade, in part due to changes in who was leading the process; the final push 
came when a key legal advisor was brought back into the process, and a yellow card from the 
European Union regarding the country failing to meet certain standards for the tuna industry. The 
drafting began under the leadership of a key legal advisor, but was abruptly halted when this 
individual unexpectedly passed away. The draft was then redone by consultants based outside of 
the country, but the new draft did not satisfy stakeholders back in the Solomon Islands. A key 
legal advisor that had helped with the earliest draft of the bill was then brought back into the 
process, and was able to hold multiple consultations with stakeholders and greatly assist with 
finalizing the draft. This advisor was frequently referenced as the person responsible for 
developing Section 18 and for generally ensuring CMT systems were considered within the bill. 
One government participant emphasized the importance of this person’s role, stating, “If you 
haven’t got a champion in the ministry who is going to keep [legislation] going…and [key 
advisor] was a very important part of that. No mistaking, [that advisor] feels ownership of that 
Act.” Participants also frequently referenced this advisor as a key person leading the process for 
developing regulations and SOPs, and for interpreting parts of the Act that were considered 
confusing (e.g. plan approval process). It was clear that the successful passing of the Act was in 
large part due to the dedicated work of a few key leaders at various stages in its development. 
Outside of the FMA (2015), but potentially relevant to the submission of plans, a few 
national level participants mentioned the importance of a local “champion” getting the 
government to assist communities with local level management issues. One NGO professional 
told the following story about a local leader from a very rural community: 
So [logging company is] digging up the corals and he wants to take them to court 
and all that. He’s sort of, pushing ahead with trying to register their management 
plan…He isn’t the chief directly but he is related to the chief, I think he is of the 
resource-owning tribe…But he’s such a strong person, yah. I think that’s, that was 
something that we found was key to successful CBRM was needing someone 
from the community who is really geared up by the cause, to lead. He’s been back 
and forth to the ministry many times. He’s a person that, when he opens the door 
like ohhhh no, you’re bombarded with ‘why are you not doing this!’ And yah, 
everyone, he’s famous in the ministries…But for me, I’m like good for him…He 
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is someone who is still keen, and despite spending his own resources, he’s still, 
he’s still there. He’s managed to get funding for his community. 
The individual described here was unusual in his willingness to use his own money to solve a 
marine management issue, as many local residents felt this should be a job paid by the 
government. He was also unusually persistent, earning him the reputation mentioned amongst 
government professionals. There were a few other enthusiastic local leaders known at the 
national level, one of whom was the pastor from the village where I stayed. He was relatively 
new to the scene, but had made a point of making his concerns about how the government used 
money (or didn’t) to help local communities. These sort of local leaders were sought after by 
NGOs doing CBRM, and, as in the story above, seem likely candidates for being able to push 
management plans through the approval process, perhaps even without the help of NGOs. In 
reflecting on what makes CBRM efforts successful, a researcher previously employed by an 
NGO recounted:  
We also tried to identify key people within communities who were sort of movers and 
shakers, and work with them as a facilitator of the processes…they weren’t necessarily 
the village chief, always having to work through the village chief, but also working with 
the person who could facilitate the process. 
Although these leaders are seen as important, it is difficult to know how common it is to be able 
to find such a leader. The village I visited did not seem to have anyone capable of leading the 
plan process, and national level participants implied that there are many places where they could 
not work because such leaders were lacking (or overwhelmed by internal conflicts). The Act 
itself seems unlikely to change this, unless having the option of getting outside enforcement 
becomes an incentive for communities to find a leader (internally or externally) so that they can 
take advantage of it. This will be dependent on communities actually learning about the Act, 
which at the moment only happens through infrequent workshops in easy-to-access communities. 
In the village I visited, having a workshop on the Act had certainly stirred interest, but seemed 
unlikely to catalyze action in the near future. Community leaders seemed more concerned with 
getting their village registered in general with the government before focusing on registering a 
marine area; that said, there was certainly interest and it seemed possible that the leaders might 
attempt to write a plan in the next few years.  
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 When I asked local level residents what would be needed to successfully submit a plan 
under the Act, should they decide to do so, the importance of having a leader was emphasized. 
This was brought up seemingly without any awareness of the similar conversation happening at 
the national level. The village seemed to be genuinely wishing for a leader both to move fisheries 
rules into place and to unite the community more generally. The community seemed to be 
fragmented and participants frequently lamented the lack of ability for the community be of “one 
mind” (See Sec. 4.2.1: Civic Epistemologies). To solve this problem, several participants 
mentioned the need for a leader, but differed in their perspectives on who this leader should be—
some felt it should be someone from outside the community, while most suggested it be someone 
internal. The village had a community chair, and some residents mentioned he may be someone 
to lead the process,  but others seemed to ignore this possibility. This variation in perspectives is 
evident in the following quotes: 
“Our leaders in our community will do it…They will do it, because we only, well they 
already plan it, to do it.” (Local resident) 
  
“Someone13 who has the character that really attract people. By now, people will judging 
people, is a really big problem…The only thing is that that person who wants something 
to happen, he must be able to work with the young people, work with the elder people, so 
that they will support it. But if someone, who just really, isolating himself from people, 
they will not really support this program.” (Local teacher) 
 
In contrast, the following conversation with a local ranger indicated a preference for an outsider: 
Ranger: We are from one village, one community, they will not hear me. They 
will not like to follow me. Because I am a relative, they don’t care about me. 
That’s why we always say, we always need some people to come, and we just 
assist. 
Interviewer: From somewhere else. 
Ranger: Yah. 
                                               
13 When asked to clarify who this would be, this person indicated that it could be someone in Bili but they were not 
sure which individual as they were new to living in the village.  
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Interviewer: Even if it was somewhere else in the Western Province, like what if 
somebody came from Chea14, for example, they would listen to them more? 
Local fisher: No, not like that. People, say from Honiara, or Ghizo. 
Interviewer: From big cities. 
Local fisher: Yah. They come, and do awareness program, or workshop. 
Something like that, something that, the community, full whole community will 
come listen…that will be my time, to talk to them. I can speak to them, I can 
explain, what they don’t want to listen at me…Like you people, because you are 
different color, they will respect you. 
The difference in perspectives here may reflect differences in level of exposure to foreign 
researchers and NGO workshops. The ranger had attended NGO workshops in the past, and is a 
good example of how western ways of thinking are beginning to change this community. 
Although he speaks as though this is others’ reaction to foreigners, it could very easily just be his 
own perspective, though it may also be representative others in the community who have had 
exposure to western culture. The introduction of scientific methods of managing fisheries is 
relatively new to the community (perhaps the last 20 years), and seems to be causing shifts in 
who is considered to have the knowledge and authority to manage resources (see Sec. 4.2.1: 
Civic Epistemologies for further discussion). It would not be surprising if this is also causing a 
shift in thinking about who should be responsible for leading management efforts. 
 Leadership was an important theme at the national level, in regard to both the submission 
of plans and the development of the FMA (2015) itself. NGO and government participants 
emphasized the importance of local “movers and shakers15” for any CBRM effort, including the 
submission of plans under the Act, and this aligned closely with the perspectives of village 
residents on what would be needed to successfully submit a plan. This reinforces suggestions 
about the importance of key leaders in governance literature, and suggests that while the FMA 
(2015) will not necessarily create new leaders, it may at least provide a means for existing 
leaders to achieve the management goals they hope for. Overall this can be considered a potential 
shift towards this prescription for AG, depending on how well leaders are actually able to submit 
plan as the Act starts to be implemented.  
                                               
14 Another village about an hour away in the same lagoon.  
15 Term used by an NGO professional during an interview. 
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4.1.7 Experimentation & Learning 
Huitema et al. (2009) describe the importance of seeing management and policy as an 
experiment, because it is “always based on incomplete and uncertain information and 
consequently has a hypothetical character, and…can be seen as a kind of hypothesis testing.” 
This is more or less synonymous with the concept of adaptive management (AM), in which the 
results of policies or interventions are constantly monitored to inform future actions. This is 
widely recognized as a preferred approach to resource management, and adaptive governance is 
seen as the governance context necessary for AM to survive and be relevant (Dietz et al. 2003, 
Chaffin et al. 2014). An enthusiasm for learning, and acceptance of failure as a necessary part of 
the learning process, and a general recognition of the importance of adaptive management were 
widespread amongst participants in this study. 
Adaptive management is a well-known concept amongst NGO and government 
professionals in Honiara. I did not evaluate how well they actually implement it, but the idea of 
regular review, monitoring, and incremental improvement seemed well-accepted. An NGO 
professional reflected (emphasis added):  
We are issues, we fail. Which is good…then every three months, we agree to 
come back and revisit those rules and see if it works, uh, what they want to 
change, kind of thing yah…[our] approach, after all this learning, we often go 
back and sit down with them and revisit this rules, that make sense? Is it okay? 
And oftentimes, yah, there are gaps. (Interview 16) 
NGO professionals like this one tended to emphasize that they have learned a lot and want the 
government to pick up on their lessons learned. Some government professionals mentioned that 
they need to learn by doing (testing the plan submission process) and also that they need more 
locally relevant sources of lessons learned. One such government professional explained: 
We have learned a lot from others, but there are our own, really own issues which, 
I’ve asked, nobody is able to answer me…like I’ve asked for case studies and 
things like that…I’m kind of aware of what our NGO partners are doing…I know 
that they have not really done that part as well, where communal resources are 
shared, how do they share them…because we are trying to progress…CBRM 
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from, lessons learned from why other managed areas are failing. And this is one 
which is like really sticking out. (Interview 15) 
This participant and others emphasized that the Solomon Islands are unique and that this requires 
that regional initiatives like CTI and the spread of CBRM approaches need to be tailored to this 
specific context. For this reason, they also tended to lament the degree to which Solomon Island 
students and professionals tend to be educated in other places, such as attending the University of 
the South Pacific in Fiji or travelling even further to places like Taiwan and Korea to learn about 
CBRM and best practices that may very well not be relevant to their context. One government 
professional had an idea about how to improve the sources of learning for Solomon Islander 
professionals: 
[NGOs] need to be better partners [to the CBRM unit], by better I’m saying more, 
there needs to be flow of information…it’s a good network…they all go to the 
same meetings and they all talk to each other…but, things have changed a lot in 
CBRM…there just need to be some better ways of actually…absorbing the 
lessons. (Interview 8) 
These concerns were shared by an NGO professional, who also had an idea about how to fix it: 
We’re hoping to fund a person…to be seconded to the ministry…we’re hoping 
that person will play a role to support the ministry in that work but also to bring 
lessons out. (Interview 13) 
In addition to generally recognizing the importance of learning, and context-specific learning in 
particular, national level participants referred to the process of implementing the Act as a 
learning process in itself. A government professional explained: 
All the management plans that we have in the communities are still on the rough 
draft basis, and we haven’t gone through any single plans yet…even with our 
partners, under this act yet. So, it will be like in 2018? Maybe in the years to come 
like, we could be learning from the process of all these. (Interview 14) 
Inshore fisheries governance actors have clearly created an atmosphere that is supportive of 
learning and conducive to the process of adaptive management. However, there is some question 
of how well the Act will integrate into this context. It is unclear how an AM approach (i.e., 
regular review and adjustments) will be implemented through the FMA (2015). The widespread 
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understanding of AM made it possible to ask fairly directly about the concerns of aligning with 
an AM approach, resulting in conversations like this: 
Interviewer: If [communities] have a plan that is gazetted, what will they do if 
they want to change it?  
Government professional (Interview 6): That is also a concern for us. But it didn’t 
really specify in the Act that a management plan should be for five years, or six 
years, but we are hoping that will be captured in the regulations. 
Interviewer: How often it needs to be revisited? 
Government professional: Yes.  
Interviewer: I see. 
Government professional: Because taking of the management plan to gazette is 
not an easy process. 
Interviewer: So once it goes through it’s not something you want to do again?  
Government professional: Yes. 
Interviewer: What are some of the other concerns… 
Government professional: Or maybe, there is also a way, like amendment, like 
part of the plan could be amended.  
Interviewer: I see, and that’s a little faster. 
Government professional: Yes. 
This suggests that while AM may not be particularly well facilitated in the Act as it stands now, 
government professionals may be working to interpret the Act through regulations that may 
provide the space needed to do this. The amendment mentioned in this conversation is likely 
referring to where the revision of plans is mentioned in the Act:  
Fisheries Management Plans are to provide for the duration and periodic review of the 
Plan (FMA (2015), Second Schedule (14)). 
Subject to adoption by Provincial Assembly, the Director, in consultation with the 
relevant communities, may amend a Community Fisheries Management Plan by notice 
in the Gazette (Part 4, s.18 (8), bolded text added).  
 
Where assessment and review of any existing Community Fisheries Management Plan 
shows that any of the management measures, powers or authorities are sufficiently 
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ineffective to secure management of the fisheries resources or compliance with 
management measures, the Director, Provincial Executive and relevant community shall 
consult with a view to revising the Plan.  (FMA (2015), Second Schedule (15)).  
These provisions suggest that the Director leads amendments, rather than the community, which 
may limit local leaders’ ability to initiate AM. It does at least require that revisions be done in 
consultation with the community, but given the processes NGOs already have in place for 
revising plans in consultation with communities, it might be more ideal if this process could be 
initiated by local committees or at the very least NGO partners. It may be that the CBRM unit of 
MFMR may be able to initiate this; there was some mention that this unit will be responsible for 
processing plan approval on behalf of the Director, and if so it seems reasonable that they might 
also take the lead with revisions. This may help to facilitate AM, but especially given the limited 
capacity of the CBRM unit (five people), it still seems that devolving this to the local level 
would be more efficient. This would fit with the context of CMT, in which communities 
currently can change their rules as they see fit. 
 Overall, there is a supportive atmosphere for experimentation in inshore fisheries 
governance, but it is unclear how well the Act will fit into this. If the provisions for amendments 
within the Act are implemented in a way that allows this to be done easily, ideally by those 
responsible for implementing the plan at the local level, the Act will not change the degree of 
experimentation and AM practiced in this context. If this isn’t the case, the Act may actually 
decrease the ability of actors to practice AM, making inshore fisheries governance less adaptive 
overall. 
4.1.8 Inclusion of Multiple Types of Knowledge  
This recommendation for adaptive governance draws on past research on LEK and 
recognizes the value of combining these knowledge systems with Western scientific approaches. 
Folke et al. (2005) cite case studies where this has been done with some success, including a case 
involving conservation of the bumphead parrotfish in the Solomon Islands (i.e., Aswani and 
Hamilton 2004). Folke (2006) includes this as one of four “essential parts” of adaptive 
governance, writing that governance should include “developing management practices that 
combine different ecological knowledge systems to interpret and respond to ecosystem feedback 
and continuously learn.” This links back to the recommendation for experimentation and 
learning discussed in the previous section; the idea here is that learning and adaptive 
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management will be better carried out if actors are willing and able to draw not only on science 
but also on local and practice-based knowledge. A substantial amount of the research on the 
integration of science and LEK has been done in the context of the Pacific and even in the 
Solomon Islands, particularly with regard to how to integrate CMT with ecosystem-based 
approaches to resource management (e.g. Foale and Manele 2004, Cinner and Aswani 2007, 
Aswani 2011, Bennett 2012). Researchers who work on these topics are frequently involved in 
CBRM in the Solomon Islands as partners to NGOs and as policy advisors, which seems to help 
integrate this perspective into inshore fisheries governance. Participants at the national level 
showed a striking openness to the idea of combining LEK with Western forms of science, with 
several participants indicating awareness of academic discourse on the value of and challenges 
with incorporating multiple types of knowledge into decision making processes. A few NGO 
professionals had contributed or even led the publishing of papers on this topic. 
The majority of participants at the national level suggested that both LEK and Western 
approaches to science are valuable and necessary for successful management. When asked about 
how they approach LEK, many NGO participants brought up participatory mapping as one way 
to draw on local knowledge. Others mentioned using it as a starting point for where to survey for 
certain species (e.g. dugong), or where to set up a protected area for spawning fish. One NGO 
professional eagerly described this process: 
In science…I’m almost throwing up my master’s thesis. In science and ecological 
knowledge…I make them run parallel, so they…cross each other through ground-
truthing, or through maps, or like I might conduct a surfvey, that’s local 
ecological knowledge. Do you have dugongs here?...when was the last time you 
saw it?...And then you run a survey. You run a ground-truthing survey. Or you 
look at sat images. That’s when you know that, yah the same dugong, which they 
said they saw, around this time…scientifically that’s when it does it’s breeding. 
(Interview 9) 
In addition to using LEK to inform their efforts, NGOs and researchers pointed out that science 
in turn can supplement local communities’ knowledge in order to improve their management 
practices. One example that was frequently mentioned was fish spawning, as described by this 
NGO professional: 
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This is what communities, again the science part of they don’t understand…They 
just see it every, for them it’s every new moon I’ll go there and I’ll catch ten fish 
and, but…because of commercial, when it went commercial side of things that’s 
what’s made it really…so live fish trade is banned here. (Interview 10) 
This participant proceeded to recount a story in which local communities had let foreign 
industries know where fish aggregated for spawning, and had allowed these companies to 
take all the fish because they did not understand that this is when they were reproducing. 
Several other NGOs and researchers touched on this or similar stories, emphasizing that 
explaining breeding was an important component of workshops they held at the local 
level.  
The narrative regarding how LEK and science are combined in resource 
management in the Solomon Islands was surprisingly consistent between the local level 
and the national level. A local fisher described, for example, how science was added to 
their community’s existing knowledge of fish spawning aggregations:  
In our areas, we normally see the school of fish…It’s the season to, they grouping, go in 
group. So by the time we saw that one, we still go and kill it…we enjoy harvesting when 
they come into group. Man, we kill a lot of them...without realizing that, [workshop] give 
us demonstration about the breeding matters…so now, when we look fish in group, we 
just ignore them, we just make sure they can breed a lot. (Interview B3) 
In both Honiara and the Marovo Lagoon village, discussion of combining science and LEK 
focused in on a few topics in particular: spawning aggregations, ecosystem connections, size of 
sexual maturity in reef fish, habitat protection, and the benefits of rotational closures of reef 
areas to fishing. These narratives became the focus of the KG analysis, which enables a more 
nuanced conversation of “openness to different types of knowledge” in this context. Before 
jumping into this part of the analysis, the overall potential of the FMA (2015) to catalyze a shift 
towards AG is summarized in the next section. 
 
4.1.9 Summary of Adaptive Governance Elements 
It is difficult to predict the extent to which the FMA (2015) will enable adaptive 
governance because so much depends on the nuances of how it is implemented. However, the 
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analysis here shows several areas where inshore fisheries governance is beginning to reflect 
some elements of adaptive governance. A summary of each element is provided below: 
• Bioregional Fit: There is no immediate change to bioregional fit brought about by the 
Act. Some improvement to fit could be brought about if adjacent communities are able to 
register plans for their tenure areas such that their collective areas encompass key aspects 
of the marine ecosystem (e.g. adult fish habitat and mangrove nursery areas are 
registered). 
• Boundaries: The Act increases the clarity of boundaries for locally managed marine 
areas, but it is unclear whether or not that will increase or decrease adaptiveness in this 
context. It may make it more difficult for some communities to come to consensus than if 
clear boundaries were not required. 
• Nested Polycentricity: The Act indicates a slight shift towards increased polycentricity 
by formalizing the role of local councils in management decisions. Plans will still need to 
be approved at the national level, indicating that a fair degree of centrality is retained. 
However, this comes along with interview comments from government staff indicating an 
interest in expanding the CBRM unit and the role of MFMR as a coordinating body for 
government and NGO CBRM projects. The suggestion for polycentricity recognizes a 
need to balance bottom-up decentralized approaches with centralized coordination; 
inshore fisheries governance seems to be towards the centralized end of the spectrum at 
the moment, but with the help of the Act and the growth of the CBRM unit, it may be 
starting to move towards a more decentralized approach. 
• Enforcement and Conflict Resolution: The Act reflects this suggestion for AG because 
it provides a mechanism for internal and external enforcement and conflict resolution. 
The community committees provide an internal mechanism that fits with existing 
governance arrangements in most communities, while registering community rules as a 
bylaw allows for external support through the government police and court system. The 
social impacts of adding this external source of enforcement within a customary system 
should be monitored carefully to determine whether this actually increases adaptiveness 
or in fact decreases it by damaging intra- or inter- community relationships. 
• Inclusive Participation: The requirement for local committees indicates recognition 
within the Act of the importance of including local decision-makers in nationally-
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enforced fisheries management. This does not inherently indicate a value for participation 
because it is essentially mandatory under the Constitution (i.e.: recognition of the rights 
of tenure holders over their resources). However, the explicit attention to including a 
local governance structure and the mention of the need for consultation for both plan 
creation and revision does suggest intentional emphasis on participation. At broader 
geographic scales, it is likely that only communities with strong governance will be able 
to benefit from the Act. Overall, there is a slight shift towards inclusive participation, but 
this would be better realized if mechanisms for supporting communities with weaker 
governance were included. Alternatively, other options outside of the Act may need to be 
developed for these communities. 
• Leadership: Key leaders present at both the national and local level reinforce the 
suggestion that individual leaders play an important role in adaptive governance. The 
FMA (2015) will not necessarily increase the number of key leaders at the local level, but 
it does provide a new option for existing leaders to improve reef management. If these 
leaders are able to successfully improve management through submitting plans under the 
Act, this may inspire other community leaders to take action. Overall, this element of 
adaptive governance is supported and potentially improved by the introduction of the 
FMA (2015).  
• Experimentation and Learning: Governance actors are generally very supportive of an 
AM approach and frequently mentioned the importance of lessons learned from CBRM. 
The extent to which the Act enables or hinders this positive stance towards AM is 
dependent on how the regulations and SOPs for the Act are developed. Therefore the Act 
overall has potential to increase the degree to which inshore governance reflects this 
principle of AG. 
• Inclusion of Multiple Types of Knowledge: Actors in this SES are open to the use of 
multiple types of knowledge, especially in terms of using LEK to find focus areas for 
conservation and management. Participants frequently mentioned scientific assessments 
are used to confirm information provided through locals’ LEK. The Act requires 
information about tenure boundaries and rights (part of LEK) and also habitat 
assessments and regular monitoring (science). In this initial assessment, this suggests that 
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the Act reflects this suggestion for AG because plans will be inclusive of both types of 
knowledge, but this will be explored more deeply in the next section. 
 
From the above summary, the elements of AG most likely to emerge through 
implementation of the Act, and through the continued work of inshore fisheries governance 
actors more broadly, are enforcement, participation, leadership, experimentation, and openness 
to multiple types of knowledge. The regulations and SOPs will be critical to the successful 
realization of these potential elements of AG. Continuing to assess the Act with specific attention 
to these elements could provide an opportunity to witness the emergence of adaptive governance, 
or to better understand the barriers that prevent its emergence. The next section provides some 
insight into potential barriers to watch for in regard to the AG suggestion for the inclusion of 
multiple types of knowledge. 
 
4.2 Knowledge Governance Arrangements 
This section provides an empirical analysis of knowledge governance in the context of 
inshore fisheries governance and the FMA (2015) in particular. The knowledge governance 
framework was developed to consider how specific knowledge-to-action interventions fit into the 
broader cultural context where they are implemented; this allows researchers to “examine 
whether interventions conform with existing knowledge governance arrangements, or challenge 
them, and consider the implications of this in relation to their goals” (van Kerkhoff and Pilbeam 
2017). Here, the “intervention” is the FMA (2015), and more specifically the management plans 
that can be submitted to the government under this act. The goal of this intervention, as indicated 
within interviews, is to improve enforcement of local fisheries rules by allowing communities to 
call on the government for assistance, specifically through police and court systems. The broader 
cultural context of inshore fisheries governance explored through the civic epistemologies lens 
includes the hybrid system of local-level CMT alongside the western-style MFMR. The 
knowledge system is defined by (van Kerkhoff and Szlezak 2016) as the network of actors that 
combines knowledge with action and learning (see Sec. 3.4: Frameworks for Data Analysis). 
Here this includes local tribes and leaders, the MFMR and MECCDM, and the various NGOs 
that work with the government to manage marine resources.  
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In this analysis, I focus on the implications of the text describing the substantive and 
procedural requirements for the submission of community plans under the Act (i.e., Section 17-
18, and the Second Schedule) and supplement this with data gathered through the interviews at 
the national and local level. This analysis is organized into three sections, reflecting the KG 
“layers” of civic epistemologies, knowledge systems, and interventions described by van 
Kerkhoff and Pilbeam (2017). Interviews, especially those at the local level but inclusive of 
those at the national level, formed the bulk of the data used to describe the civic epistemology 
that underlies inshore fisheries governance, and the knowledge systems that structure 
knowledge-action interactions within these governance arrangements. The text of the Act, 
supplemented with interview information from those who contributed to drafting the Act, is the 
primary data used to investigate the Act, to specifically determine how the local fisheries 
management plans might align with existing KG arrangements.  
 
4.2.1 Civic Epistemologies 
This section addresses the KG question “what are the deep-seated patterns that structure 
the governance of knowledge?” The left two columns of Table 2 guided the questions for 
analysis for this section, bringing the focus to dominant styles of knowledge making, public 
accountability, foundations for expertise, demonstrations of effectiveness, transparency, and 
practices for securing objectivity. Here I step back from the FMA (2015) and allow the broader 
context in which decisions are made about inshore fisheries to become the subject of analysis. 
This includes past actions by the government and NGOs working in co-management 
relationships with communities, as well as how communities operate on their own via customary 
management systems. This draws on data from interviews with actors at both levels, and on 
limited participant observation from time spent at national conferences and in one local village. 
It does touch on the specifics of the Act at times, because one way to identify norms was to ask 
questions about the barriers and catalysts for registering a plan under the Act. This section offers 
a basic, limited understanding of the norms around knowledge use in the Solomon Islands capital 
city and in one village with a particularly high level of exposure to western culture; it does not 
try to paint a comprehensive picture of all the nuances of Solomon Islands culture, which is 
incredibly diverse and would require significantly more time in the field at multiple villages with 
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varying levels of exposure to western influences. It does, however, provide some insight into the 
value of utilizing the KG framework within an AG analysis in a non-western setting. 
The first element of civic epistemologies framework, “dominant styles of knowledge-
making,” considers which types of knowledge are chosen for use in management actions, with an 
emphasis on the process by which this occurs. Here a major theme that arose was ‘consensus.’ 
At the local level, participants frequently emphasized the need to be of “one mind” when asked 
what was required to successfully register a plan, or to regulate fisheries in general. Similar to 
the findings of van Kerkhoff and Pilbeam (2017) in Palau, consensus was key to making 
decisions about fisheries or any other subject affecting the community. When asked about 
barriers to submitting a plan, or putting rules in place in any form, community participants 
lamented the lack of ability to form consensus around decisions. One local fisher emphasized, 
“looking at this community, they are not really one…some people they want something to 
benefit their future generations, some people they just don’t interested in that” (Interview B4). 
Another fisher, in discussing the desired state for community fisheries, stated “…we want to 
keep [our sea]. And replant the stone again, and everything like that…so our communities will 
be one, and manage our place again” (B5). Here, the use of the word “keep” essentially means 
sustain, and “replant the stone” is referring to the need to restore coral habitats. Across many 
interviews this theme of needing to come together was brought up, with many blaming the 
fragmentation in the community on the younger generation. Regardless of why this 
fragmentation is occurring, that this was so frequently mentioned as a critical issue indicates a 
strong desire for consensus in decision making. This resonates with the previous discussion of 
NGOs refusing to work with communities that did not appear to be in agreement about the desire 
for NGO engagement or that were involved in disputes over tenure area boundaries (see Sec. 
4.1.2: Boundaries). Communities and NGOs seem well aware that consensus is the prominent 
mode of decision making and that management interventions that do not take this into account 
will likely fail. 
At both the national and local level, consultation with the entire community was 
considered essential to making any viable decision about marine resources. This relates to the 
KG element of “transparency,” and fits naturally with the consensus approach to decision 
making. This aspect of civic epistemologies focuses on the visibility of experts and the 
expectations around how the public is involved in knowledge-making and decision making. 
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When asked to describe their process for engaging with communities, all four of the 
environmental NGOs operating in the country identified multiple consultations with 
communities as key for success. One NGO professional stated, “in my own experience working 
with fisheries in the rural community, it only works well when there was…transparency. Open 
up and, is inclusive. You don’t pick his own members from his own family kind of thing.” In 
other words, consultations had to be done with all of the community in order for a community to 
view the process as transparent, and to thereby be willing to come to consensus around 
management practices. 
The importance of consultation was also emphasized by local participants in discussing 
how decisions are made outside of NGO or government co-management situations; these 
participants live in a village without these arrangements. When local community members were 
asked how decisions are made in the community for any topic, including fisheries, they described 
meeting as a group, having individuals suggest ideas to the group, and then voting on desired 
outcomes. The importance of making collective decisions involving consultation with all 
members of the community arose in initial interviews when I naively attempted to ask who the 
“decision-makers” were in the community. Participants, especially community leaders, recoiled 
from the label “decision-maker.” One leader used the example of someone from a different 
village requesting to use the communities’ resources by writing a letter: 
Local leader (Interview B1): I take the letter and read to the community and explain to 
the community what is in the letter. And if the community agree, because the community 
can either disagree or agree. I explain to them that they will decide, and okay we agree, or 
no no no no, we do not agree. 
Interviewer: Okay…so you’re the spokesperson, but you do it with everyone, get 
everyone’s permission. 
Local leader: Not a decision-maker, no.  
This leader was adamant that I not refer to them as a decision-maker, which made them visibly 
uncomfortable. Descriptions of community meetings by local participants consistently described 
decisions as collective, with no one ever saying anything other than “the community decides,” no 
matter how carefully I asked if there were specific people who made decisions. The most 
detailed information I was given was that if a few community members, perhaps five or less, 
disagreed with a point, they were usually ignored and the decision was made anyway, but if 
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larger groups disagreed the decision would not be made. I was not able to compare this to my 
own observations because no community meetings occurred while I was living in the village, or 
at least none that I was made aware of—most participants indicated that community meetings 
happened rarely. Though I was only able to draw from interviews, consultation is clearly seen by 
both NGO professionals and community residents as the process necessary to verify that all 
relevant stakeholders were included and to create transparency, which was considered critical for 
reaching consensus.  
More general observations from participating in daily life in this village suggest that 
while this insistence on an inclusive, consultative process is considered a general best practice in 
the Solomon Islands, it may be particularly emphasized in this village because of the status of 
their customary system. Informal conversations and some responses within interviews indicated 
that the chief of the village had lost the respect of the community relatively recently, perhaps in 
the last thirty years. This seemed to have to do with community members perceiving the chief as 
greedy because he had taken the bulk of new money brought in by foreign industry (e.g. live fish 
trade) and possibly by conservation organizations. I did not probe this extensively to verify all 
the details during interviews because it was a very sensitive topic, but given that the introduction 
of a cash economy has been documented as a cause of conflict, jealousy, and the decline of 
customary systems in other parts of the Solomon Islands (e.g. Johannes 1978, Ruddle et al. 1992, 
Hviding and Baines 1994, MacIntyre and Foale 2004), it is not surprising that this seems to have 
occurred in a village with easy access to a ferry port and therefore extensive exposure to 
processes of westernization. As a result of this conflict with the chief, the community is now 
governed by a community council led by an elected chairperson, but this arrangement is new and 
it was unclear whether all members of the community endorsed it. The community was described 
as fragmented both by local residents and by foreign researchers who had worked there in the 
past. One researcher noted that the strongest leadership at the time they worked there came from 
a women’s group within the church, but that it took more than a year for this group to speak 
openly even though (or perhaps because) this researcher was from their province (Interview 
#16). Although I encountered this group they did not seem to have participated in workshops 
relevant to the FMA (2015) and were quite hesitant to interact with me. Overall, the governance 
dynamics of this community were quite complex and seemingly in a period of transition; I do not 
claim here to have a complete understanding but do think that this has a bearing on the civic 
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epistemology within the village. Specifically, the decline of the chief’s power and rise of a new 
democratic governance arrangement may be leading local participants to de-emphasize the 
power of individuals in decision making, and instead emphasize the importance of inclusiveness 
and transparency more than they would have otherwise. 
The collective, “community decides” mantra raises questions about who might be seen as 
an expert in the community and what roles these experts have in decision making. Pertaining to 
Jasanoff’s (2005) “foundations for expertise,” at the local level there seemed to be disagreement 
and uncertainty around who serves as an expert in the community, but seeming agreement that 
no one person, even an expert, would be responsible for making decisions about the fishery. 
Contrary to situations where customary governance is still strong, there did not seem to be many 
widely-respected elders in the community who were seen to hold substantial knowledge about 
fisheries, with the exception of one or two fishers. These fishers were primarily respected for 
their ability to find and catch specific species of fish, rather than for their knowledge of 
management practices. There did, however, seem to be relatively widespread respect for foreign 
experts who had come in either through NGOs or MFMR to give workshops on fishing and 
management best practices. Many participants noted that information like the size of fish to catch 
to ensure reproduction, and the need for sufficient coral and mangrove habitat to support fish 
populations, was useful, but no rules have been put in place in the community that would bring 
this knowledge to action. Overall, the community seems to be in a transition towards more 
western concepts of scientists as experts, but there is still some residual respect for the few 
knowledgeable fishers in the community.  
The means by which locals might attempt to discern who deserves the title of expert 
relate closely to two the other civic epistemology themes of public accountability and 
demonstration practices. Public accountability has to do with how knowledge is tested by the 
public and deemed trustworthy, while demonstration practices relate to how the outcomes of the 
application of knowledge are shown to the public. In this context, the two combine—knowledge 
is tested in practice and deemed trustworthy if it produces the benefits it claims to provide. This 
is illustrated by a participant asked to reflect on whether or not workshop content was true: “we 
use [workshop information], then we can find out, oh it’s true, oh, it’s not work, it’s not true. We 
can feel it, and we can know it, we can see” (Interview B2). In other words, knowledge must be 
tested directly by the public rather than presented by experts or tested through experiments; 
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something is true if it is experienced first-hand. This aspect of epistemology underlies how 
science and LEK are deemed credible, as discussed in the Knowledge Systems section. 
The final theme of “securing objectivity” manifested much differently in this context than 
in the western contexts to which Jasanoff (2005) first applied it (e.g. U.S.). Objectivity here is 
the idea that “knowledge looks the same from every standpoint in society; it is untainted by bias 
and independent of the claimant’s subjective preferences” (Jasanoff 2005). Jasanoff (2005) 
described states as seeking to secure objectivity, or at least the appearance of objectivity, in their 
knowledge claims; van Kerkhoff and Pilbeam (2017), however, found that objectivity was not 
valued at the local level in Palau except for use in communicating to external, international 
audiences. In Bili village, local residents were concerned with objectivity in the sense that the 
consensus process meant that everyone’s voice needed to be considered, even those who 
disagreed with recommended best practices for fisheries management. Overall they seemed less 
concerned with whether knowledge itself was subject to bias, and more concerned with who 
would benefit from its use (does it serve the preferences of the claimant?). Although none of the 
participants indicated disagreement with ideas discussed in workshops (e.g., not fishing during 
spawning aggregations), one local participant (Interview B13) mentioned that others would 
sometimes disagree with these recommendations: “some maybe not believe, ‘ah no, the fish will, 
you know one fish, deliver so much thousand eggs…how come will the fish will getting 
finished,’ they said.” This difference in opinion between community members appears to be 
what is keeping them from coming to consensus around fisheries rules, which seems to indicate a 
value for objectivity in the sense that there is enough respect for diverging views for the 
community to avoid making a decision. 
 
4.2.2 Knowledge Systems 
 This section represents the second nested layer in van Kerkhoff and Pilbeam’s (2017) 
framework, which has been slightly modified here to ask “how do institutional arrangements 
shape the boundary between science and LEK, and decision making?” (Figure 2). The 
knowledge systems layer of the KG framework considers networks of actors that compose the 
knowledge system(s), and examines how these actors work to present knowledge as credible, 
legitimate, and salient to the concerns of decision-makers. This is influenced by the civic 
epistemology just described, with many points of connection between different aspects of 
  74 
epistemology and elements of knowledge systems (van Kerkhoff and Pilbeam 2017). For 
instance, credibility within the knowledge systems concept is closely related to public 
accountability and expertise. While civic epistemology focuses on broad patterns within society, 
the knowledge systems part of the framework focuses on how scientific information (or, in this 
case, any type of knowledge) is perceived as a result of these underlying epistemologies. This 
framework was previously applied to the use of science by a specific boundary institution, a 
protected area network (van Kerkhoff and Pilbeam 2017), but in this study I apply it to the more 
informal network of local communities, NGOs, and government ministries responsible for 
inshore fisheries in the Solomon Islands. I evaluate how these actors navigate between science 
and LEK when working with local communities, including the village I stayed in. This analysis 
is primarily limited to the perspectives of NGO and government participants, because it was not 
feasible to travel to do interviews in all the places where these actors engage. Interviews 
conducted in Bili village offer at least some sense of a local perspective but are not 
representative of all villages given the diversity of tribal cultures across the archipelago.  
 In the context of inshore fisheries governance, and the community plans aspect of the Act 
in particular, there are two distinct bodies of decision-makers to consider when analyzing 
knowledge systems: local level leaders and committees, and national level government 
professionals (Figure 2). To create a community fisheries management plan that meets the 
criteria set forth in the Act, both local committees and government professionals responsible for 
approving plans will need to see the content of the plans as salient, credible, and legitimate. It is 
likely that the actors at the boundary between these decision making bodies will be 
environmental NGOs, who are experienced with navigating the boundary between local 
communities and international funders. The growing role of the MFMR CBRM unit in hands-on, 
local level work likely means that they will share this role with NGOs during the implementation 
of the FMA (2015). One NGO participant described this role of moving knowledge across the 
boundary between local and national or international decision-makers quite directly: 
You have science there, to satisfy this part of the world [pointing at donors in a 
self-drawn diagram], so they are seeing that you have science. You make and 
show those alignments and linkages with local and cultural knowledge. Which 
makes this part of the world view it [pointing at communities on diagram]. That 
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has been one of my selling points…I communicate complex knowledge, across 
this belt. (Interview 9) 
This confirms the role of NGOs as boundary organizations operating between 
communities at the local scale and donors at the international scale. It also has 
implications for how knowledge is established as credible between these audiences, 
which is discussed in the next section. 
This relationship between 
decision-makers, plans, and 
NGO actors along with the 
CBRM Unit is depicted in 
Figure 3. Several NGOs have 
also gained experience 
operating at the boundary 
between communities and 
government professionals 
when crafting plans to 
register under the PAA (2010). At this stage only a couple of plans have been submitted 
under the FMA(2015), and the government is still finalizing processes for approving 
them, therefore these previous instances of boundary work by NGOs will be the focus of 
analysis here. Given the similarities between the PAA (2010) and the FMA (2015), along 
with the similarities in the types of information desired by the MFMR and by 
international funders (e.g. monitoring data, amount of area under protection or active 
management), this analysis should be able to provide some insight into how these NGOs 
might navigate this boundary when submitting plans under the FMA (2015).  
 
4.2.2.1 Credibility 
 The discussion of public accountability and demonstration practices in the Civic 
Epistemologies section has immediate bearing on how different types of knowledge are 
determined to be credible in a local setting. Cash et al. (2003) defined credibility as “the 
scientific adequacy of the technical evidence and arguments.” This definition was used in 
sustainability science research and therefore was specifically interested in science; by 
Figure 2. Visualization of knowledge systems and 
boundary work by NGOs. 
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incorporating the civic epistemologies lens here, the knowledge governance approach asks a 
broader question of how any evidence or knowledge is considered to be reliable or sound (van 
Kerkhoff and Pilbeam 2017), rather than assuming that this soundness comes from being 
“scientifically adequate” (Cash et al. 2003). In this context, there is an emphasis on the need for 
knowledge to be produced by individuals themselves, which makes the credibility and legitimacy 
of knowledge in the eyes of local residents closely interrelated. In this section I focus on 
credibility, but this is linked to the section on legitimacy because both aspects of the knowledge 
system relate closely to the concept of participation. 
Interviews with NGO professionals indicated that NGOs have needed to bring science to 
communities in a way that allows community members to test this knowledge through their own 
experience. NGO and government participants frequently mentioned the importance of training 
communities on monitoring and management practices, so that they could do this independent 
from outside help. Though this seems motivated in part by a need to expand capacity beyond the 
limited resources of these actors, it has the effect of giving local residents an opportunity for 
hands-on learning that brings them directly into the knowledge-making process. Community 
level participants frequently commented on this. One local leader emphasized: 
In our culture…people want to see first. People want to prove and people want to 
see first, still working, or no…This is one type of our culture. Our black people 
have this type…they want to prove. And if they prove…okay, register it. 
(Interview B6) 
In the above quote, the leader is discussing the information provided through workshops, 
such as suggestions to try a rotational closure or introduce catch size limits. This participant 
emphasizes the importance of “proving” through seeing how well a recommendation works 
before finalizing it in a plan to be submitted under the Act. This relates back to the concepts of 
public accountability and demonstration practices, which underlie this use of experience for 
establishing the credibility of knowledge. Rather than evaluating knowledge based on whether it 
follows a certain approach (e.g. scientific method), credibility is about whether or not it 
generates the benefits it claims to deliver, as determined by an individual directly.  
An example of credible knowledge came from a narrative that emerged about a particular 
elderly fisher who was considered to be one of the few with expert knowledge on the habits of 
fish and the best means of catching different species. This story emerged from an interview with 
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this fisher and comments by two others on this individual’s role in the community. The fisher 
demonstrated deep knowledge of fishing garnered over time from older family members. This 
individual would secure buoys on the reef to indicate to other fishers where to go for certain 
kinds of fish. From this fisher’s perspective, the problems the community experienced with 
lower catches were in part the result of not knowing how to fish well, rather than there just not 
being enough fish:  
[Fish populations] not as different [as before]. All those people who just go out 
fishing, they find it hard…because they don’t know where to, to catch at this 
time…or they don’t know so for them it’s hard. But yah, not like before…before 
you go out fishing, every time you catch. Now you really need to be specializing 
…then you can catch. (Interview B14) 
A younger fisher mentioned the usefulness of these buoys (Interview B5), while another 
community member criticized the elderly fisher for doing this on the grounds that it leads to 
depletion of the fish stock (Interview B13). This latter fisher complained: 
The moon small they say ‘oh, one, this type of fish, they will heap (spawn) at this 
spot, then all the small kids, they go and catch the fish…so, I think that elder 
people should stop doing that…so that they, so that nobody knows, then the fish 
will put more eggs in. (Interview B13) 
Regardless of these differing positions, these participants indicated obvious belief that the 
LEK possessed by this fisher leads to increased catches and is therefore credible. 
Another way of gaining credibility, mentioned by two participants (one NGO and one 
local resident), was the use of visuals and particularly showing videos of successful management 
practices in similar contexts, such as other Pacific islands. The local resident, a teacher, 
commented, “show [the community] the clip, the poster…some people, when they talk, they 
never believe, but when they show in reality…to show the lifestyle, or the cycle of the fish, and 
the type of benefits…so that we can get the good benefit” (Interview B3). This format of sharing 
information seems as close as someone can get to personal experience without actually getting it, 
which would fit into the experience-based aspect of the epistemology of the village. In summary, 
NGOs build credibility at the local scale by allowing individuals to test knowledge themselves, 
and by showing videos that demonstrate how management practices have worked in other 
settings. 
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 Building credibility at the national scale seems to require a different approach to 
presenting knowledge; this could be detected in a conversation that emerged around the purpose 
of reef monitoring and of training communities to do this. NGOs and government participants 
emphasized the need to find monitoring methods that produce quality data but also are easy for 
communities to carry out. However, there were differences between interviewees at the national 
level regarding which of these two goals for training communities is important, and this is one 
place where differences in how credibility is established between the local and national scale 
came out. The study participants concerned with establishing credibility at the local scale 
emphasized the value of hands-on participation for building trust in management practices, while 
most others, especially government professionals, were more concerned with the need to 
measure progress using the data that trained local residents could produce. This seems to indicate 
a concern for establishing the credibility of management efforts in the eyes of decision-makers at 
the national scale. This difference in emphasis around monitoring came out in discussions of 
how to measure the success of periodically closed areas or bans on fishing certain species of fish. 
One government professional explained:  
The importance of monitoring is to really find out whether their management plan 
is working or not…if their reefs are improving or their ecosystems are improving 
or not. Based on the baseline surveys and the trend of the information, the data 
that is collected. (Interview 6) 
An NGO professional agreed with this, though they emphasized that the data was meant for 
communities: 
We’ll help train and stuff…how can we get the communities to monitor…not for 
us, but monitor their own progress using their management plans. (Interview 10) 
In contrast, a researcher noted: 
All of the monitoring is really just…the benefits of it are about participation, 
getting people engaged, in physically doing things in the environment. Rather 
than just holding meetings, and talking about it… (Interview 3) 
The first two participants appear to be interested in establishing credibility at the national scale, 
while the latter is concerned with the local scale; participation was viewed as necessary for 
building credibility locally, while sufficient data was needed for building credibility in the eyes 
of government professionals at the national level. The second quote, by the NGO participant, is 
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interesting because suggesting monitoring is for communities, and not NGOs or government, 
assumes that this is the sort of knowledge communities consider to be a credible way to know if 
progress is being made. This does not seem to align with the focus on testing through experience 
(e.g., do fishers think they catch more fish after a rotational closure), but does point towards what 
may be a bit of a shift or at least a dichotomy in how actors at the local level are testing 
knowledge. There were a few participants at the local level who mentioned that monitoring could 
be used to track the success of a management method; these tended to be individuals who had 
participated in the work of NGOs in the past. One leader mentioned “we close this mpa 
area…we put the baseline here, we pull the tape measure, just see” (Interview B6). This may 
indicate that NGO emphasis on monitoring during engagement with communities may be 
starting to shift the community towards seeing monitoring as a method for building credible 
knowledge.  
 
4.2.2.2 Legitimacy 
Legitimacy is defined by Cash et al. (2003) as “the perception that the production of 
information and technology has been respectful of stakeholders’ divergent values and beliefs, 
unbiased in its conduct, and fair in its treatment of opposing views and interests.” This element 
of knowledge systems is difficult to tease out from credibility in a context where, at the local 
level at least, knowledge is considered credible based in part on the process by which it was 
produced (participatory). In essence, there is a dual purpose for participation in knowledge 
creation and testing at the local level. Regarding credibility, participation is meant to give 
individuals the opportunity to test knowledge. Regarding legitimacy, participation is about 
demonstrating that the right individuals are included in the process, so that local residents feel 
that knowledge in being generated and used in a way that is respectful of the community. This 
latter purpose is the focus for discussion here. 
The concept of legitimacy brings attention to the process for how NGOs and researchers 
engage with communities overall, in addition to the specific methods of knowledge-making they 
employ. The ability to even engage with a community in the Solomon Islands has to do with 
whether or not communities view the overall projects of NGOs or researchers as legitimate. Van 
Kerkhoff and Pilbeam (2017) operationalize legitimacy by looking at whose version of the 
“desired outcome” dominates and why, which brings attention to why NGOs and researchers 
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engage with communities in the first place—do they engage to bring about the outcomes desired 
by communities, or the outcomes desired by their donors or organization? This is a very sensitive 
topic in this context due to past conflicts between NGOs and communities regarding whether 
biodiversity conservation or improved livelihoods should be prioritized (Walter and Hamilton 
2014). There has recently been an apparent shift towards more intentionally serving the needs of 
communities, for instance by seeking to directly improve livelihoods (Walter and Hamilton 
2014). There were two keys for establishing the legitimacy of a project (and therefore its overall 
success) in the eyes of community residents. First, projects needed to demonstrate that they 
would bring tangible benefits to communities; this was mentioned by all four NGOs and by 
government professionals. One NGO professional recounted: 
Two other instances, one that is driven by science, one that is driven by 
community. Science in fact…like places spawning aggregation site. It is science-
driven. So if I go and tell them, oh your place very important, that’s a spawning 
aggregation site…they don’t care. Biodiversity, people in the community they 
don’t care about it. Even, even if you tell them how special their place is…but if, 
if it is initiated by them, if they see that it is, oh, it is important, and they inclusive 
of not only, not only just reefs, but include, all that sort of other part of livelihood, 
include, it resonates. It resonates. (Interview 11) 
In other words, the engagement of this NGO resonated (i.e. was seen as legitimate) when the 
desired outcomes of the community (e.g. livelihood improvement) were emphasized rather than 
the desired outcome of the NGO and its donors (e.g. biodiversity conservation). In discussing 
similar work by the government, a local leader pointed out: 
When we talk about natural resources, very important because the only thing that 
we benefits. You know? So when the government was bring some laws or policy 
to the local people, they will be closing the other areas that the local people 
continue to get the money to pay, fees for their children…So when we come to 
close it mpa area. Or we doing other things that we close everything…is stop me 
to harvesting, then where…I go to bring, to bring the income, you know? 
(Interview B6) 
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The need to transition from a conservation focus to a livelihood focus has been reported 
to some extent in the literature (e.g. Schwarz et al. 2011, Walter and Hamilton 2014) and 
was a prominent theme at both the national and local level. 
The second key to establishing legitimacy was that NGOs needed to enter communities 
through the right people, and ensure that their approaches were inclusive and not seen to benefit 
any one family or sector of the village more than others. The importance of entering 
communities with no strings attached, for instance, without particular ties to specific individuals 
within the community, was discussed in the early analysis of AG elements (see Sec. 4.1.5: 
Inclusive Participation for a more detailed discussion). This emphasizes the tie between the AG 
suggestion for inclusive participation and the establishment of legitimacy within knowledge 
systems at the local level. Local actors seem to determine whether or not the production of 
knowledge is considered unbiased (and therefore legitimate) in its conduct based on if they were 
involved in creating it, as this entails that their interests are being fairly considered. As discussed 
earlier, the relatively recent shift towards a more democratic system of community-level 
governance in Bili Village may have increased residents’ emphasis on broad participation in 
knowledge processes as especially necessary for establishing legitimacy. Nonetheless, interviews 
with NGOs who had worked across multiple communities indicated that this value for inclusion 
was commonly held at the local level (see 4.1.5: Inclusive Participation). 
The importance of entering a community in the right way is an ethic reflected in national 
legislation that requires that researchers, including myself, must seek permission to do research 
not only from the national government but also from the leader of the relevant village. My 
position as a researcher provided a unique opportunity for reflexive observations of how I myself 
navigated the process of establishing legitimacy. As a researcher, the legitimacy of my own 
project was challenged by local residents who wanted to know what my project would do for 
them (or who had suggestions on what they wanted out of it); this came up in at least four 
interviews, usually with local leaders. One leader wanted to make sure my results would be 
reported back to the government (which they will be), and another wanted to know what the 
community would get directly (e.g. a summary sheet of results). It appeared that some research 
had been done there in the past with little follow up from researchers (though there were also 
cases where researchers had followed up). One leader refused to interview with me until he had 
asked me a series of questions about what motivates my research, and then took a week to think 
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about my consent form before agreeing to participate. In all cases it was critical to be clear about 
how my project would or would not benefit them, and also about how it would benefit me (e.g. 
getting a degree). My own experiences clearly reflected the experiences of interview participants 
regarding the importance of recognizing the priorities of communities, and of entering into a 
community through local leaders but also through being completely open and transparent with all 
members of the community.  
Overall, legitimacy of knowledge at the local level comes not only from how a project is 
carried out (e.g. through participatory monitoring), but also how a project is initiated in the first 
place. Although NGOs must meet the goals of their donors, which often have more to do with 
biodiversity, the importance of delivering tangible benefits to communities, especially for big 
NGO projects, was emphasized at the national level and echoed at the local level. However, even 
when information was considered to be credible and legitimate at the local level, it did not 
always appear to be salient. 
 
4.2.2.3 Salience 
The salience of knowledge has to do with its relevance to the needs of decision-makers. 
The questions I modified from van Kerkhoff and Pilbeam’s (2017) framework revolve around 
how visible decision-makers needs are to knowledge-producers, what processes enable this 
visibility, and whose interests are included or excluded during that process. One way to get at the 
salience of knowledge is to consider whose knowledge wins out when a conflict arises between 
science and LEK. In van Kerkhoff and Pilbeam’s (2017) study of Palau, a conflict around how 
mangroves are managed revealed that even though available science suggests retaining 
mangroves is better for coastal ecosystems, locals would frequently cut them down to provide 
channels for their boats. At the local level in the Marovo Lagoon, a similar phenomenon seemed 
to occur in relation to whether or not certain marine areas were closed to fishing on a rotational 
basis—this is where salience can be examined more closely. 
The village I lived in once had a protected area for a spawning aggregation, and two 
marine managed areas with a rotational closure schedule that had been established with 
assistance from a university researcher and partner NGO. Most village residents remembered this 
set up, and confirmed not only that rotational closures aligned with their customary systems, but 
also that they believed this was a reliable way to manage resources. Despite this, there were no 
  83 
areas actively managed while I was there, except for a small and poorly enforced protected area 
in a satellite village, and there seemed to be skepticism around whether the village could manage 
to reach agreement on revitalizing these management areas. At the same time, when asked what 
strategy they would employ if they could convince the rest of the village to comply, almost every 
local participant suggested they would try a rotational area, with some suggesting that they 
would add catch size limits as well. There is therefore a clear gap between what local residents 
know will work, and what they are actually doing—in day-to-day life, they fish anywhere for 
both subsistence and market purposes. In this case, it may be that while there is agreement on the 
legitimacy of the management technique, a difference is arising regarding whether or not the 
information is regarded as salient by those seeking different “desired outcomes.” In the Civic 
Epistemologies section I discussed local concerns that the community is not of “one mind.” 
Some actors at the local level want fisheries managed, while they report that others just want to 
fish—it appears that those with the latter goal are currently dominating action in this village. 
Additional interviews are needed to better understand if this is because these actors do not find 
scientific or even LEK-based recommendations for rotational closures to be credible, or if it is 
just not considered to be relevant enough to their goals.  
A second story related to salience comes out of observations from participation in the 
coral farming project. Scientific research has provided the basic understanding that although 
corals look like rocks, they are actually relatively fragile colonies of animals that collectively 
build the calcium carbonate structures that give them their rock-like appearance. This 
understanding has driven environmental education efforts in places like Hawaii that instruct 
snorkelers and swimmers not to stand on coral; in places heavily frequently by snorkelers, the 
tops of coral heads are typically flat and dead because many people stand on them to take a break 
from swimming, crushing the calcium carbonate structures. In Marovo Lagoon, coral was 
frequently referred to as “rock,” and islanders did not hesitate to stand on them even when I 
repeatedly tried to explain why that was a bad idea. They either laughed at the suggestion or just 
ignored me completely; this occurred even with rangers who had been trained in conservation 
and basic marine biology by NGOs. This is a clear instance where scientific information draws a 
different conclusion than local knowledge, and as with van Kerkhoff and Pilbeam’s (2017) 
mangrove example, local knowledge, or at least the desire to take a break from swimming, 
appears to win.   
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In the cases of both the managed areas and standing on coral, local residents are, for the 
most part, aware of scientific information (and LEK/CMT, in the case of rotational closures) but 
do not follow it. It is, however, difficult to parse out whether this is because the scientific 
information itself is not considered salient, or because decisions are being made for a different 
reason altogether (e.g. the need for cash outweighs the need to manage for long-term outcomes). 
Perhaps the decision to not close an area or to step on coral is based on users seeking a desired 
outcome (e.g. marketable fish, a break from swimming), regardless of what available information 
suggests about the best option for marine management. If this is the case, it does not seem 
possible that any scientific information or LEK crafted with the goal of marine management 
could be considered salient—what would be relevant is research that is seen to have a direct link 
to improved livelihoods and well-being.  
The category of salience within the KG framework includes consideration of the visibility 
of the knowledge needs of decision-makers. It seems evident from the conversations at the 
national level around how science and LEK are used together that the knowledge needs of 
community residents are relatively well-known, but also that to some degree these gaps are 
identified by national level actors rather than by local actors themselves. This seems evident in 
the sort of “show them things they do not otherwise see” language of science filling gaps in LEK 
(e.g. Interview 10), such as with information on fish reproduction and habitat connectivity. This 
seems to imply a sense of national actors wanting to impart certain knowledge, rather than 
wanting to deliver requested knowledge, thus resulting in available information not being salient 
enough to translate into use. On the other hand, while fishers in the village seemed to be ignoring 
management recommendations, many local level participants mentioned an appreciation for 
workshops and a desire for more information about fishing practices from the national level. It is 
possible that this was mentioned because it is what participants thought I would want to hear as a 
foreigner, but most requests seemed to be honest. This may indicate that these particular 
individuals might see scientific research as more salient than others in the community. It is 
noteworthy that these requests for further workshops were perhaps coming from those with a 
higher level of education or at least a greater amount of experience with past NGO conservation 
efforts. I conducted interviews in English, and although participants could choose to respond in 
pijin, this likely skewed my sample towards more educated residents or at least those with a 
greater exposure to (and therefore comfort with) foreigners and their ideas. Given this, it may be 
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that I happened to interview residents who see research as more salient, but who do not have the 
social power (despite many of them being leaders) to convince the rest of the community of this.  
To the limited extent that this community can be taken to represent concerns at the local 
level, it appears that while scientific research may be done in a way that is considered both 
credible and legitimate, its salience to local level concerns seems to vary. Shifts in how 
knowledge is viewed as salient, and even credible, seem to be occurring in the village I visited 
and likely in other places that have been exposed to NGOs. Future research might look at how 
both exposure to western conservation practice and level of education affects the way knowledge 
is received in this context.  
 
4.2.3 Intervention: Community marine management plans within the FMA (2015) 
Van Kerkhoff and Pilbeam (2017) posit that an “empirical understanding of socio-
cultural practices, power and institutions is necessary to achieve interventions that can operate 
effectively towards a specific goal.” To be successful, actors carrying out a conservation 
intervention might either align their action with the KG arrangements of the context, or be 
explicitly aware of the KG arrangements being challenged and of how the intervention may be 
seeking to change them. In this section the FMA (2015) is considered as an intervention, and is 
evaluated in terms of the degree to which it might align with the knowledge systems and 
underlying civic epistemology described in the previous sections. This section is guided by the 
questions in the far left column of Table 2 (see Sec. 3.4.2: Characterizing Knowledge 
Governance). The provision for the submission of plans described in Section 18 and the 
associated Second Schedule of the Act is the focus for analysis. 
To evaluate the alignment of Section 18 with KG arrangements, attention must be given 
to both the substance of the plans and the process for their development and approval. The 
substantive requirements for plans is taken here as an indication of what information will be 
considered credible, legitimate, and salient by government decision-makers responsible for 
approving plans.   
As described in the Second Schedule, community management plans must include 
information about the following: the boundaries of any relevant area, the fisheries, the status of 
the fishery resource, a risk assessment of immediate or potential environmental, economic, 
social, or cultural threats, a description of the fisheries habitat and ecosystem, any customary 
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rights, and the regional and international context of the area (3(a-g)). The plans must take into 
account any other national, provincial or community plans that have been approved or that are in 
development, and must ensure consistency with any areas that have been registered under the 
PAA (2010). Finally, the plans must identify management measures and penalties for violating 
them, indicators for whether or not these measures are effective, requirements for monitoring and 
assessing progress towards these indicators, and who will be responsible for enforcing these 
measures. These requirements identify the information that will be considered salient to 
government decision-makers, and embedded within this are assumptions about what will make a 
plan credible. 
The earlier discussed comments by NGO and government participants regarding the 
integration of science and LEK makes it immediately obvious that local communities are 
unlikely to possess the knowledge required for these plans. For instance, being able to describe 
an ecosystem requires knowing what an ecosystem is; similarly, developing indicators and a 
monitoring plan implies an understanding of AM. As previously mentioned, things like fish 
spawning, habitat connectivity, and monitoring processes, among other scientific practices and 
perspectives, are the focus of environmental education efforts by NGOs and the CBRM Unit, 
implying that communities otherwise do not have this information and do not utilize practices 
like habitat surveys or risk assessments. In regard to threats, one government staff member 
mentioned a situation where something communities considered to be a risk was not found to be 
a risk during assessment:  
[The communities] come up with the assessment then we guide them, like oh this, 
that’s not really true in your case. We learned that yah, they kind of…they think 
that a lot of things will disturb their resources, but that specific context, might not 
even go through. Like for example we just went to one of our sites…when they do 
reef assessment for some of the species they say that oh, sedimentation will spoil, 
there is potential risk on sedimentation, there is potential risk from logging, and 
etcetera, but according to our baseline surveys, they really don’t have that 
threat…They also preserve their forest so there is no such thing like that. There is 
very good current system there…so their main risk or their threat actually is from 
their own, they are throwing rubbish in the reef. (Interview 15) 
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Here, a government survey was used to debunk local perspectives; given that this was a 
conversation with someone likely involved in approving plans, it seems unlikely that a 
community plan that contains a risk assessment not validated through surveys is going to 
pass approval at the national level. As discussed earlier, the use of baseline surveys and 
regular monitoring by NGOs and the CBRM unit when working with communities 
suggests that this will be the case not only for risk assessments but also for other content 
like the description of the fishery and its habitat. All in all, the criteria that plans must 
meet to be deemed credible at the national level does not seem to account for what local 
level communities consider to be credible or salient. A comparison to how NGOs have 
approached plans in the past indicates that not only are there tensions between knowledge 
systems here, but also that the stringent requirements of the plans may significantly 
impede the ability of NGOs and the CBRM unit to navigate the boundary between these 
systems effectively. 
 Professionals within all four NGOs consistently reported that they had learned to write 
plans that are no longer than one to two pages. This allows them to create something easily 
understood by communities, and that can simply be posted on a community billboard. This 
strategy came after past attempts at more extensive plans were found to be too cumbersome for 
communities, as explained by a participant with previous NGO experience: 
We [NGOs] all move away from those…when we started we had that long list of 
criteria, and again it was, it was too complex, for communities themselves. They 
don’t need all that information…we all moved to these one page management 
plans which, had sort of the key information for the community. Because 
communities can, of course, do management, they don’t need the Act. (Interview 
8) 
Another NGO professional echoed this when reflecting on an instance where a detailed plan had 
been attempted: 
Reflecting back on the forms of management plans that we have now, that was the 
thickest. So it depended on what the community wanted to have in the 
management plan…for them they wanted everything, like the tribes, the, sort of 
background information, and then it lead to what the management rules were. And 
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penal—so the enforcement section. But a lot of people don’t read, so we sort of 
then went on to just one pagers…it was just like posters. (Interview 13) 
The two things prominent in these statement are that 1) plans must be simple, and 2) plans must 
be about what the communities want. This was relatively well accepted, even by government 
staff responsible for approving plans, and yet the requirements under the Act they helped to write 
are not aligned with these priorities. One government professional discussed this directly, stating: 
So in the management plan they are going to write everything down. We are 
going to capture everything, what we are trying to do now is capture everything in 
the management plan. At first we thought the management plan would be just a 
very like, one page, two page. But we think ahead and we said oh no, we also 
have to consider this in the management plan, it should be a document. (Interview 
6) 
When asked to clarify what was meant by document, this participant confirmed that this would 
be longer than one or two pages. While NGOs seem to have learned to make plans more relevant 
to communities by making them shorter, there will now be no choice but to have them be longer. 
The substantive requirements of the plans suggests that NGOs or the CBRM unit will need to 
engage with communities to help them produce information that will be considered salient and 
credible at the national level. This is even acknowledged in the Second Schedule, which reads: 
A community fisheries management plan may provide for the technical assistance if any, 
to be provided to the applicants by the Director, Provincial Executive and, where 
appropriate, any competent non-government organization or other such body. (9) 
Although the Act invites the participation of NGOs, the requirement for detailed plans 
simultaneously impedes their strategy of mediating the boundary between the local and national 
scales by creating simple documents. This seems similar to what happened under the 
PAA(2010), where the strict criteria at the national level has led to the need for multiple 
revisions that have been extensive enough that only one plan (for the Arnavons) has actually 
made it through the registration process. 
 Looking beyond the substance of plans to the process for their development, the criteria 
are initially more promising. As discussed in the AG analysis, plans must include the consent of 
relevant customary rights holders, and must be developed and revised in consultation with these 
rights holders. This aligns well with established processes of engaging communities in 
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knowledge-making in order to establish credibility and build legitimacy with communities. At 
the same time, the second point emphasized in the quotes above indicates that this may not be 
enough. NGO participants emphasized that the goal of this engagement needs to be about what 
communities want, which relates back to idea that legitimacy is established not only by engaging 
the relevant leaders, but also by indicating that communities will reap tangible benefits from 
NGO or government engagement. Although the Act (2015) is clearly supportive of communities’ 
customary rights, it does not account well for their priorities. The effort to make plans that are 
salient and credible at the national level is likely to come at the cost of establishing legitimacy at 
the local level.  
 This tension between knowledge systems could potentially be better understood if re-
conceptualized as a conflict between the epistemology that underlies village society and the 
epistemology of the formal government enforcement mechanisms (e.g. police, courts) that the 
plans must adhere to. This is discussed further in the next section. 
 
4.2.4 Modifying the Knowledge Governance Approach to Evaluate Policy 
 
Considering a society as consisting of two different civic epistemologies is different than 
the earlier depiction of civic epistemology as something that surrounds both the local and 
national actors (Figure 2), and instead envisions that these two groups of actors are operating 
within different paradigms with differing epistemologies (Figure 3).  
 
 
Figure 3. Re-conceptualizing knowledge governance arrangements. 
This perspective seems appropriate in a context where governance is a hybrid of a 
western parliamentary system and a Melanesian customary system. Jasanoff (2005) developed 
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the civic epistemologies concept to compare the epistemologies of different western nations, 
where she cautions her readers that the categorization she uses (e.g. expertise, objectivity, etc) 
“offers conceptual clarity but at enormous risk of reductionism.” She goes on to note that civic 
epistemology can change, and the framework is meant only to outline deep-seated patterns “to 
which the practices of ruling institutions and actors continually return, in part because they are 
held in place through time-honored legal, political, and bureaucratic practices.” Finally, Jasanoff 
(2005) writes: 
Like any aspects of culture, the attributes of civic epistemology have to be performed and 
reperformed to maintain their hold as living, breathing instruments. It follows that radical 
breaks and disjunctures can always occur in theory, but shocks of exceptional severity 
may be needed to precipitate them. 
Here I am proposing that the Solomon Islands may represent a situation where there are no 
“time-honored” bureaucratic structures, and where the process of colonialization and de-
colonization through gaining independence may have created a “shock of exceptional severity” 
to the pre-existing customary systems of Melanesia. While the risk of reductionism has been 
acknowledged, it might be slightly lessened by recognizing policy creation in customary contexts 
as a space where the civic epistemologies of two countries collide (in this case, Britain and the 
Solomon Islands), rather than by 
trying to evaluate the nation as 
having a single civic 
epistemology as I have done in 
this analysis. A future analysis 
could give more attention to 
describing the civic epistemology 
that underlies court procedures 
and government enforcement 
mechanisms more broadly, and then compare that to the sort of analysis of the civic 
epistemology of local residents carried out here. The results of such analysis could show where a 
policy sits on a spectrum between aligning with one civic epistemology versus the other (Figure 
4).  
Figure 4. Hypothetical results of a modified KG analysis. 
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 This idea relates closely to van Kerkhoff and Pilbeam’s (2017) discussion of a 
“bifurcation of knowledge governance” between local actors and external, western actors, 
referred to as “audiences.” As in Palau, a dichotomy has arisen between “audiences,” but the 
dichotomy is slightly different here due to focusing analysis on a policy, rather than on an 
intervention like the Palau Protected Area Network (PAN). In Palau, the PAN operated at the 
boundary between the Western-styled KG arrangements of international actors and the KG 
arrangements of local Palauans (van Kerkhoff and Pilbeam 2017). In the Solomon Islands, 
NGOs and the CBRM Unit must similarly navigate between the KG arrangements of local 
villages and the KG arrangements of formal government enforcement mechanisms, but their 
actions at this boundary are restricted by the substantive and procedural requirements for plans 
submitted under the FMA(2015). Hypothetically, describing the two separate civic 
epistemologies at play here could take the conversation beyond the discussion about the need to 
communicate different messages to satisfy the KG arrangements of each audience, to a 
conversation about how to craft policies that provide the space necessary to bridge these 
audiences. Although the analysis here does not fully do that, the discussion of the Act as an 
intervention suggests that the current fisheries policy has been crafted to match the civic 
epistemology and broader KG arrangements of formal government without much consideration 
of the KG arrangements at the local scale. Attention to the differences in these epistemologies in 
combination with an analysis of boundary work being done between knowledge systems could 
perhaps guide future fisheries policy or the SOPs and regulations associated with the current 
policy that will be flexible enough to accommodate boundary work. This is one way that a KG 
approach can potentially contribute to a broader analysis of AG, as discussed in the next section. 
 
4.3 Summary of Knowledge Governance Arrangements  
This KG analysis framed the FMA (2015) as an intervention in inshore fisheries 
governance occurring within the broader cultural context of the Solomon Islands. The civic 
epistemology of Solomon Islands society included consensus as a dominant style of knowledge-
making. Interview participants at the national and local level emphasized the importance of 
transparent processes of generating knowledge and the need for decisions to be collective and 
inclusive of all members of the community. The inclusion of differing perspectives was an 
important part of establishing objectivity, to such an extent that the community preferred to avoid 
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a decision if all residents were not present and in agreement. Investigating the themes of 
expertise, public accountability, and demonstration practices revealed that knowledge is tested 
by individuals, rather than external experts, through applying recommendations and seeing 
whether or not promised wellbeing and livelihood benefits are realized.  
The knowledge systems layer of analysis reflected this aspect of the civic epistemology 
in that the participation of community members in knowledge-making and testing was critical for 
establishing both the credibility and legitimacy of knowledge. Individuals trusted their own 
experience most in determining whether the information provided was sound (i.e. credible), and 
did not trust NGO projects or researchers that did not enter communities transparently and with 
permission of leaders and the acceptance of the community overall. The investigation of salience 
revealed differing perspectives amongst community residents that may indicate either a shift or 
split in local perspectives on the salience of western science vs LEK at this scale. Most interview 
participants indicated a value for monitoring, rotational areas, and other scientific concepts, 
especially those that aligned with LEK, but the fact that this did not lead to the implementation 
of the recommendations in practice suggests that this information was not considered salient to 
all members of the community. 
 The intervention of the FMA (2015) within this context does not align particularly well 
with existing knowledge governance arrangements. The procedural requirements for the 
development of plans seem to honor local processes for establishing legitimacy, such as by 
recognizing customary rights and requiring consultations with rights-holders at key decision 
points. However, the substantive requirements for plans indicate differing perceptions of what 
knowledge is salient and credible at the national level versus the local level. Specifically, 
scientifically-grounded information is required at the national level and this does not align with 
experience-based approach to validating knowledge at the local level. This raises the suggestion 
discussed above regarding the need for future research to consider the possibility that legislation 
like the FMA (2015) exists at a boundary between public ways of knowing and the formal, 
western-style epistemology of government enforcement systems (i.e., police and courts).  
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5 CONCLUSIONS: Reflections on the Utility of a Combined Analysis and Avenues for 
Future Research 
 
The results of this research provide a first attempt at an analysis that explicitly focuses on 
the suggestion that multiple types of knowledge be included in decision making within an 
emerging adaptive governance regime. Specifically, the goal of this research was to investigate 
the utility of a knowledge governance approach for evaluating: (1) the extent to which multiple 
types of knowledge are incorporated into decision making around inshore fisheries in the 
Solomon Islands; and (2) what the norms and rules around how LEK and science are valued may 
indicate about who is included in this process, which relates to the suggestion for inclusiveness 
and considerations of good governance within an emerging adaptive governance regime.  
Interview data and the national and regional institutional context of the FMA (2015) 
made it immediately obvious that LEK and science are frequently drawn upon during the 
governance of inshore fisheries in the Solomon Islands. This is facilitated by a CBRM-focused 
approach to inshore fisheries that connects local level work all the way up to conservation and 
resource management priorities for the region (e.g. CTI). The governance analysis revealed that 
the FMA (2015) includes and seems to value some, but not all, of the key elements for AG. 
There is a particular focus on the AG suggestions for inclusive participation, learning, and the 
facilitation of adaptive management. These are considered keys to successful community work, 
and have to some degree been accounted for in the FMA (2015). Participants spoke frequently of 
the value of both LEK and science in decision making, often in terms of LEK being a useful 
starting point for identifying conservation and management priorities and science being useful to 
validate this information and guide assessments of progress towards community-directed 
fisheries management goals. This apparent openness to different types of knowledge was 
investigated more deeply using the lens of knowledge governance.  
The analysis of the knowledge governance arrangements brought a focus to the work of 
boundary organizations in navigating between LEK and science, and the limitations that the 
FMA (2015) may place on this work. Consideration of the civic epistemology underlying 
Solomon Islands society, especially at the local scale, indicated that NGOs and the MFMR 
CBRM Unit must adjust their conservation and management efforts to fit islanders’ consensus-
style, experience-based approach to incorporating knowledge into decision making. These 
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institutions navigate between differing standards at the local versus national (or international) 
scale for establishing knowledge as credible, salient, and legitimate. At the local level institutions 
establish legitimacy by finding the right entry point (key individuals) into the community, and by 
including residents in knowledge-making processes. These institutions make knowledge salient 
by choosing goals that are relevant to livelihoods. Establishing credibility has to do with who 
was producing knowledge—credible knowledge must come from individuals themselves. This 
relates closely to how legitimacy is established. Individuals must be able to create and test 
knowledge directly, or at least be able to see relevant visuals of the results it has led to in other 
places, before perceiving the creation or testing of knowledge as legitimate. Credibility was a 
complicated topic at the local level because there seems to be a shift, or at least disagreement 
between community factions, related to whose knowledge is considered sound (e.g. local fishers 
(i.e. themselves), or foreign experts), illustrating divergence between individual perspectives 
rather than homogeneity at the local level. At the national or international level, credibility, 
salience, and legitimacy had much more to do with the processes of scientific monitoring and 
validation that are more familiar in Western settings. Understanding these nuances allows for 
some tentative conclusions around the barriers that may arise to the further emergence of AG in 
the Solomon Islands, despite the FMA (2015) seeming to reflect some of the necessary elements 
of AG.  
NGO and government professionals seemed to understand differences in national versus 
local level knowledge systems, and accordingly do their best to adapt the way knowledge is 
presented at the local and national level. Their ability to do this when submitting plans under the 
FMA (2015), however, may be restricted. A specific barrier that may arise is that the criteria 
required for plans under the Act may cause a tension between establishing saliency and 
credibility at the local versus national scales. The more Western-style civic epistemology 
underlying the Act may limit boundary institutions’ ability to adjust plans to align with 
knowledge processes at the local scale, causing a gridlock during the plan development stage. 
This initial analysis of KG arrangements suggests that when considering policy as an 
intervention, a KG analysis might be more useful if structured to account for the possibility that 
multiple civic epistemologies are interacting within a single society. Although this is likely the 
case in any nation, it may be particularly relevant in contexts where the interaction of customary 
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systems with Western systems like English Common Law is ongoing, with neither system clearly 
dominating knowledge processes. 
Broadly, assessing KG arrangements within an analysis of AG can foster a more nuanced 
conversation around how knowledge types are being integrated in decision making. 
Consideration of knowledge systems and civic epistemologies brings attention to the relevance 
conversations within LEK literature about knowledge and power, while also, in the context of 
analyzing a policy, illustrates the importance of accounting for interactions between customary 
law and Western systems of law. Current research in AG is already beginning to focus on 
identifying legal elements for AG (e.g. De Caro et al. 2017); the KG angle suggests a need for 
future research on how the legal aspects of AG may be substantially different in non-Western 
contexts where customary law is also at play. The KG approach also draws attention to the 
significance of the interaction between formal laws and informal institutions like customs and 
norms. 
Employing the KG approach additionally spurs reflection on the assumptions that 
underlie the broader suggestions for adaptive governance. For instance, the KG analysis suggests 
that the requirement for monitoring within adaptive management is now situated within Western 
ways of knowing. Similarly, strategies related to bioregional fit, such as ecosystem-based 
management, are based on attention to habitat and ecosystem-connections that do not seem to be 
incorporated into local ways of knowing and local approaches to resource management. On the 
other hand, a spin-off of the science-LEK literature in the Solomon Islands (and Pacific region) 
has involved a conversation around reframing customary practices as principles for adaptation 
(e.g. Aswani et al. 2007). The KG approach brings attention to this literature and suggests that 
future work in AG could draw more heavily on this body of research to explore ways of 
expanding or adjusting suggestions for what AG looks like in non-Western contexts. 
Specifically, it may be useful to conduct a theoretical investigation of how the underlying 
epistemology of resilience thinking and adaptive governance might limit application of the 
theory in customary contexts. Such an analysis might additionally benefit from consideration of 
the extensive body of literature on CMT (e.g. Hviding 1998, Aswani 2011) and the interaction of 
customary and western legal systems (e.g. Pulea 1993), along with attention to the more limited 
literature on the adaptive capacity of customary systems (e.g. Aswani et al. 2007). 
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 As a final point of reflection, further work is needed to structure analyses that can better 
streamline the use of the KG framework within an analysis of AG. It is worth considering which 
aspects of KG are most immediately relevant to AG and what that implies for developing an 
integrated framework, rather than the sort of parallel analysis that was conducted here. In regard 
to analyzing policies like the FMA (2015), one way to do this may be to bring a more explicit 
focus to how policy will affect boundary institutions and organizations operating in a given 
system; questions about the specifics of how these institutions will be able (or unable) to present 
knowledge to different audiences could bring immediate attention to how legal and institutional 
structures need to accommodate, rather than limit, their ability to do this work effectively. 
Another relatively straightforward way to incorporate KG could be to consider when differences 
between the civic epistemology of Western-style government enforcement and that of the 
broader society might indicate that legislation is just not the right tool, and that other options 
should be pursued for catalyzing the emergence of adaptive governance. 
In this thesis I have drawn on multiple streams of scholarship to explore the role of 
knowledge in adaptive governance, including: environmental governance, sustainability science, 
“local ecological knowledge” (LEK), and context-specific research in the Solomon Islands on 
topics including customary systems and community-based resource management (CBRM). 
Bringing together multiple streams of research in this way risks not doing justice to all of the 
concerns of each stream, but keeping these conversations separate has the greater risk of failing 
to explicitly recognize the links between knowledge and power. Recognition of these links can 
identify ethical concerns around who is or is not included in governing natural resources, while 
also drawing attention to how the inclusion different types of knowledge might improve decision 
making. This study illustrates how a marine policy might align or conflict with existing 
knowledge governance arrangements, drawing attention to areas where interactions between 
knowledge systems might facilitate or hinder the emergence of adaptive governance. The results 
of this study suggest that while actors may be at least partially open to the use of different types 
of knowledge in decision-making, a lack of explicit attention to knowledge governance norms 
may lead to the exclusion of some actors (e.g. communities unable to create management plans 
that meet the criteria of the Act) during the implementation of the FMA (2015). This research 
provides a starting point for further developing an explicit awareness of knowledge-related issues 
during transitions in environmental governance.  
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